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ABSTRACT 
 
Clinical decisions regarding the diagnosis and treatment of Autism 
Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) are commonly based upon heterogeneous 
evidence and ‘expert opinion’. To date, research examining how 
paediatricians are using (or not using) evidence-based medicine (EBM) 
to diagnose and treat patients with an ASD has been absent within the 
literature across all disciplines. To understand how Australian 
paediatricians are using EBM to conceptualise, diagnose, and treat 
patients with an ASD, this study interviewed nine paediatricians in 
private practice using a face-to-face, semi-structured approach. 
Participants were asked questions about diagnosis and treatment of 
ASDs, and general questions about their attitudes towards EBM. 
Analysis of the interviews revealed four key factors affecting the clinical 
encounter with the ASD patient: the role of experience in the clinical 
encounter, the tacit and experiential nature of diagnosing and treating 
ASDs, skilful and creative interaction between the paediatrician and the 
diagnostic tools (tool “tinkering”), and the influence of political and 
social forces. This study contributes to sociological understandings of 
EBM and how it is used by paediatricians to diagnose and treat ASDs. It 
also demonstrates that this process involves constant negotiation between 
clinical experience, the evidence, intersubjective evaluation, and social 
forces.  
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Table 1: Duration of interviews 
Participant (in chronological order) Interview duration (mins.secs) 
1 16.39 
2 31.39 
3 21.41 
4 23.52 
5 17.21 
6 42.34 
7 17.55 
8 38.26 
9 32.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Groupings of participants based on years of experience practising 
as a paediatrician 
 
Groups 
Participant (numbers 
based on order of 
interview) 
Years practising as a 
paediatrician (least to most) 
 
1 
3 9 
4 10 
1 15 
6 16 
 
 
2 
2 30 
7 31 
9 31 
5 32 
8 34 
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Table 3: Diagnostic tools used in practice versus diagnostic tools believed to 
be the most accurate  
 
Group 
 
Participant 
 
Diagnostic 
tools/questionnaires used 
Most 
effective/rigorous/ 
accurate diagnostic 
tool 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
3 
- ADOS 
- Griffith’s Mental 
Developmental Scales 
ADOS 
 
4 
- M-CHAT 
- Attwood’s Oasis 
Questionnaire 
- Gillberg’s Autism Spectrum 
Screening Questionnaire 
 
ADOS 
1 - ADOS ADOS, ADI-R 
6 - CHAT 
- CBCL 
ADOS, SRS 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
- ADOS 
- M-CHAT 
- SCQ 
- Attwood’s Oasis 
Questionnaire 
- Gillberg’s Autism Spectrum 
Screening Questionnaire 
 
 
ADOS, ADI-R 
7 none ADOS 
9 none Achenbach, SRS 
5 none ADOS 
8 none - 
Shaded rows indicate responses that illustrate consistency between columns 3 and 4.   
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general 
triad – child playing alone, child-parent  
interaction, child-doctor interaction 
 
5 
 
3 
Using experience or a “gut feeling” 8 
Time spent talking with parents about their 
observations/concerns 
7 
Getting a medical history 6 
Sending child off for other assessments 5 
Using diagnostic tool(s)  5 
Conferring with professionals who have 
interacted with the child (e.g. occupational 
therapist, speech pathologist)  
5 
Conferring with preschool/school child attends 4 
Using research  3 
Using questionnaires (administered to parents, 
preschool/school)  
3 
Ruling out other underlying problems that 
could be causing ASD 
3 
Using guidelines (e.g. DSM-IV-TR) 2 
 
 
Table 5: Problems identified by participants with clinical guidelines or 
standardised tools used to diagnose ASDs 
Group Participant Problem(s) 
 
 
 
1 
3 - DSM-IV 
4 - DSM-IV 
- tools do not produce definitive diagnosis 
1 - DSM-IV 
- tools do not produce definitive diagnosis 
 
6 
- tools do not produce definitive diagnosis 
- costly: only wealthier families can afford them 
- user dependency  
- incorrect completion of tools 
 
 
 
2 
2 - DSM-IV 
- tools do not produce definitive diagnosis 
 
7 
- tools are too long 
- too much variation between tools 
- tools not well publicised  
9 - DSM-IV 
5 none – because states he does not use tools 
8 none 
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Table 6: Treatments recommended by participants 
Group Participant  Treatments recommended 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
3 
- early intervention programs 
- speech therapy 
- occupational therapy 
- consultations with psychologist 
 
 
4 
- early intervention programs 
- speech therapy 
- occupational therapy 
- consultations with psychologist 
- physiotherapy  
- help from community health centres 
 
1 
- early intervention programs 
- speech therapy 
- occupational therapy 
6 - early intervention programs 
- prescribing appropriate medications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
2 
- early intervention programs 
- speech therapy 
- occupational therapy 
7 - early intervention programs 
- prescribing appropriate medications 
 
 
9 
- early intervention programs 
- speech therapy 
- occupational therapy 
- consultations with psychologist 
- prescribing appropriate medications  
 
5 
- speech therapy 
- consultations with psychologist  
- prescribing appropriate medications  
 
8 
- speech therapy 
- occupational therapy 
- consultations with psychologist 
- prescribing appropriate medications 
 
Table 7: Learning about EBM in education and training  
Group Participant Did your education and training in paediatrics 
involve learning about EBM? (yes/no/unclear 
response) 
 
1 
3 Yes 
4 Yes 
1 Yes 
6 Yes 
 
 
2 
2 No 
7 Yes 
9 No 
5 No 
8 Unclear response 
9 
 
LIST OF GRAPHS 
 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
early 
intervention 
programs
speech therapy occupational 
therapy
consultations 
with 
psychologist
prescribing 
appropriate 
medications
physiotherapy help from 
community 
health centres
#
 o
f 
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
Graph 1: Treatments recommended by participants
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
communication 
(parents)
cost evidence gov. funding 
creating norms 
prob. treatmt 
providers
communication 
(gov.)
problems with 
colleagues
#
 p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
Graph 2: Difficulties recommending treatments for children with an ASD
10 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ASDs 
Autism spectrum disorders 
 
ABA 
Applied Behavioural Analysis 
 
ADD 
Attention Deficit Disorder 
 
ADHD 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
 
ADI-R 
Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised  
 
ADOS 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
 
CARS 
Childhood Autism Rating Scale 
 
CBCL 
Child Behavior Checklist 
 
CHAT 
Checklist for Autism in Toddlers 
 
DSM  
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual  
 
DSM-IV-TR 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (4th edition, text revised) 
 
EBM 
Evidence-based medicine 
 
ICD-10 
International Classification of Diseases (10th Revision)  
11 
 
 
M-CHAT 
The Modified Checklist for Autism in Toddlers 
 
PBS 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
 
PDDNOS 
Pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified 
 
RACP 
Royal Australasian College of Physicians 
 
RCTs 
Randomised controlled trials 
 
SCQ 
Social Communication Questionnaire 
 
SRS 
Social Responsiveness Scale 
 
WHO 
World Health Organisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
FORCING A SQUARE PEG INTO A ROUND HOLE: 
MANAGING AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS WITHIN A 
MEDICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
Introduction 
Consider the following situation: A mother and father are concerned 
about their two and a half-year-old son’s development. He has no 
language, cannot play appropriately with his toys or other children, and 
will sit and stare out a window for extended periods of time. The parents 
take their son to their general practitioner (GP) seeking more 
information. Their GP refers them to a developmental paediatrician, who 
then confirms their suspicions with a diagnosis of autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD). The developmental paediatrician recommends several 
early intervention strategies (such as ABA – applied behavioural 
analysis), speech pathology, and pharmacological intervention (such as 
Naltrexone, Ritalin, or Risperidone), explaining to the family that these 
treatment interventions have had the most success based upon the limited 
evidence available.  
 
The situation described above is typical of the process a family goes 
through when a child is diagnosed with an ASD. What is clear about this 
process is that ASDs are understood as a medical/psychiatric category 
and conceptualised within the deficit model (Molloy & Vasil 2002). The 
deficit model views behavioural symptoms as indicators of underlying 
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diseases, emphasises the individual origin of symptoms, and focuses on 
inherent flaws (D’Amato et al 2005; Zalaquett et al 2008). Discourse 
around ASDs has historically been dominated by medical and 
psychological models of deficit.  
 
However, this study presents a complex and socially nuanced picture of 
ASDs within the medical context. It moves away from the deficit 
model’s conceptualisation of ASDs and focuses on understanding how 
the medical profession negotiates with and attempts to manage the 
complexities, uncertainties and difficulties associated with diagnosing 
and treating them. This chapter will firstly introduce the reader to the 
medical definition of ASDs and discuss the wide array of capabilities and 
areas of challenge present on the autism spectrum. Secondly, this chapter 
will demonstrate the complexity and uncertainty surrounding ASDs 
within the medical context. Thirdly, the concept and function of 
evidence-based medicine (EBM) will be discussed, as well as the 
tensions that emerge between clinical judgement and applying EBM to 
the heterogeneous disorder of autism. Fourthly, this chapter will outline 
the research questions to be addressed within this study.  
 
The autism spectrum: the savant to the severely disabled 
Within the health-care domain, ASDs are officially defined within 
standardised documents (referred to as guidelines within the health-care 
14 
 
profession) such as the International Classification of Diseases-10 (ICD-
10) or The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV-TR 2000). The DSM-IV-TR lists five autism spectrum 
disorders (also referred to as pervasive developmental disorders): autistic 
disorder, Asperger’s disorder, Rett’s disorder, childhood disintegrative 
disorders, and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified 
(PDDNOS). These disorders are: 
 
Characterized by severe and pervasive impairment in several areas of 
development: reciprocal social interaction skills, communication skills, 
or the presence of stereotyped behaviours, interests, activities…These 
disorders are evident in the first years of life and are often associated 
with some degree of Mental Retardation. (American Psychiatric 
Association 2000) 
 
Social impairments can include poor eye-contact and gestures, and a 
failure to develop relationships with peers. Communication impairments 
involve a delay in or absence of (spoken) language and repetition and 
imitation of language (for example, echolalia, whereby the child repeats 
vocalisations made by another person). Stereotyped behaviours, interests 
and/or activities refer to “inflexible adherence to non-functional 
routines” (such as lining-up toys and then throwing a tantrum when the 
line is interfered with), stereotyped body movements (such as hand 
flapping or rocking the body), and “preoccupation with parts or sensory 
qualities of objects” (such as the sound an object makes, or squinting 
while holding an object up to the eyes) (Ozonoff et al 2005: 523).  
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These symptoms manifest differently in every individual with an ASD. 
Even a non-autistic person may exhibit milder forms of autistic 
symptoms, such as exhibiting poor eye contact, craving structure and 
order, or tending to engage in obsessive behaviours (Durig 2005). A 
recent study investigating social and communication impairments in the 
general population of schoolchildren found that “traits resembling those 
seen in ASD are not confined to children with a clinical diagnosis” 
(Skuse et al 2009: 134) (emphasis added). The autism spectrum is truly 
diverse. It encompasses genius qualities (the savant), eccentricities and 
quirkiness, communication difficulties, learning difficulties, social 
awkwardness, and severe disability. The severely disabled autistic 
individual may not speak or may have a limited repertoire of expressive 
communication, may have limited understanding of spoken and non-
verbal language, engages in self-injurious behaviours (such as head 
banging), usually has some form of intellectual impairment, and engages 
in sensory-related activities (self stimulatory behaviours, or “stimming”) 
such as rocking and hand-flapping. Some people on the autism spectrum 
may lead relatively normal lives with very few people realising they were 
diagnosed with an ASD as a child. Others may need ongoing full-time 
care and support. Some examples of these varied presentations of ASDs 
are discussed below. 
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For most people, conceptions of autism have largely been formed by the 
media, particularly by films such as Rain Man (1988) (Harwood & Jones 
2009). This film depicts the autistic savant, a relatively rare condition 
involving unusual skills or abilities such as memorising maps or 
telephone books, or reading at an extremely rapid rate (Treffert 2009).   
For example, Stephen Wiltshire, referred to as “the living camera” and 
described as an “autistic savant,” is able to produce detailed and accurate 
representations of cities after having only viewed them briefly. In the 
documentary Beautiful Minds: A Voyage into the Brain (Höfer & 
Röckenhaus 2007) Wiltshire is taken up in a helicopter to view the city of 
Rome for forty-five minutes. He then reproduces, over three days, what 
he has seen with pencil and paper, right down to the minute details (for 
example, the number of columns or windows that make up each 
building).  
 
However, as discussed above, ASDs are far more complex and varied 
than the picture painted by Rain Man. Temple Grandin presents another 
side of ASDs: that of the high-functioning autistic. She has obtained a 
PhD in animal science, published several books (see Grandin 1996a; 
1996b; 2005), and regularly gives talks on her experiences with autism 
(see My Experience with Autism 2008), as well as in her academic field 
of agriculture and animal behaviour. She is intelligent, articulate, and an 
advocate for animal welfare and autistic movements. Grandin emphasises 
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that many people on the spectrum are capable of attaining success across 
a variety of fields, and that autism can be seen as a valued difference 
rather than a “disability” (1996b; Scully 2003).  
 
One presentation of autism Grandin (1996a; 1996b) discusses in detail is 
the heightened sensory systems of autistic individuals. This is not a well-
understood aspect of ASDs, but it is discussed by people on the spectrum 
and within much of the parent literature (see Isaacson 2009; Grinker 
2007). Within this literature, explanations of the heightened sensory 
experience are often an attempt to give the non-autistic person a window 
into the autistic experience. For example, Isaacson (2009) provides the 
following description of mundane environmental experiences 
encountered every day by the “normal” person and how they affect his 
autistic son, Rowan: 
 
Autistic brains, it turns out, have a much greater number of nerve cells 
than “neurotypical” brains. The result can be extreme sensory 
overload. A breath of wind on Rowan’s cheek could feel like fire from 
a flame-thrower. The fluorescent lights of a supermarket or day-care 
facility could look like lights being strobed at one million times a 
second. His clothes or bedcovers could suddenly, if the wrong 
neurological switch was thrown, feel like lead weights or burning 
napalm (Isaacson 2009: 19).  
 
Another conceptualisation of autism focuses on stereotyped and 
repetitive behaviours. In my language (2007) is a video that encompasses 
this side of the spectrum, referring to these behaviours as her “native 
language”. The viewer is told that engaging in these behaviours is about 
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“being in a constant conversation with every aspect of my environment, 
reacting physically to all parts of my surroundings...it is a way of 
thinking in its own right.” The behaviours include repetitive movements 
such as rocking the body backwards and forwards, repetitive hand 
gestures such as wiggling the fingers in front of the eyes, and repetitive 
sounds made through vocalisations (such as monotonous humming) or 
with objects (such as running a coat-hanger along a window shutter). 
This side of autism is also prominent in the Australian film The Black 
Balloon (2008), where Charlie, a low-functioning autistic teenager, will 
often sit in the back garden repeatedly banging a tin pot with a wooden 
spoon and making monotonous low-pitched noises.  
 
Another very confronting aspect of ASDs is the ‘autistic meltdown’ (see 
Isaacson & Scott 2009). These tantrums demonstrate the lower-
functioning side of autism (but are also manifest across the spectrum), 
where a child may be unable to communicate with others about what is 
upsetting or frustrating them, leading the child to exhibit severe short-
term emotional and behavioural changes. The individual may scream, 
bite themselves and anyone attempting to interfere with their tantrum, 
kick, sob, bang their head repetitively against a wall, and throw things 
around a room. Each of these behaviours are shown in The Black Balloon 
during Charlie’s tantrums. Many of these tantrums are prompted by 
simple, everyday practices such as a caregiver taking something away 
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from a child. These tantrums are often violent, emotionally distressing 
for the affected individual and caregiver (and anyone observing), and can 
cause injury to the affected individual and anyone caught in the crossfire.  
 
These examples provide a glimpse into the range of experiences and 
expressions of an individual affected by autism. The variety in symptoms 
and severity in each individual on the autism spectrum is just one of the 
complexities health-care practitioners face in the diagnosis of this 
disorder. Applying the statistical analysis and science of medicine to the 
disorder of autism is perhaps one of the biggest challenges faced by 
medical practitioners, and particularly paediatricians involved in the 
diagnosis and treatment of ASDs.  
 
Diagnosing ASDs and the limitations of EBM 
While the DSM-IV-TR (2000) appears to neatly categorise the symptoms 
of ASDs into distinct diagnoses, whereby a psychologist or paediatrician 
ticks boxes to demonstrate a child “fits the criteria”, the clinical reality is 
that the diagnostic process is far more complex and disordered. The 
examples above demonstrate a key part of this complexity: the sheer 
variety of symptoms exhibited by individuals on the autism spectrum. 
Grinker (2007) provides further insight into the complexities of 
diagnosis: 
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Most experts will agree that autism is a highly variable syndrome that 
resists easy definition. There is a multitude of symptoms, appearing in 
different constellations in different people, and most of these 
symptoms will also change in form or severity throughout childhood 
and adulthood. In addition, some people diagnosed with autism are 
much more affected by autism than others. “Autism” today is really an 
autism spectrum. The spectrum is broad enough to encompass both a 
severely mentally retarded autistic person without speech and a super-
intelligent but socially awkward mathematician or physicist.  (Grinker 
2007: 10).  
 
Diagnosis is an integral part of the medical process. In the case of ASDs, 
it needs to be carried out by a paediatrician, child psychiatrist or child 
psychologist in order for the child to be eligible for services, such as 
special education and funding (Bumiller 2008). According to the 
literature, there are three main factors contributing to the complex and 
disordered nature of diagnosing ASDs.    
 
First, the diagnosis of ASDs within a medical context is seen as 
particularly problematic due to the lack of a biological marker or test to 
aid in this diagnostic process. Currently, diagnosis of this disorder is 
based on the child’s developmental history, the presence or absence of 
observed behaviours, and ruling-out other medical conditions. A 
diagnosis can only be made once symptoms are manifest, and sufficient 
data has been gathered on the behavioural symptoms exhibited by the 
child across at least two observational settings (Williams & Brayne 
2006).  
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Second, the heterogeneity of ASDs in terms of causes, age of onset, 
manifestation of symptoms, outcome and co-morbidity with other 
disorders, means that the application of this label is incredibly broad and 
thus leads to indeterminate medical definitions of this disorder amongst 
practitioners (Bumiller 2008). There is a concern that some children 
diagnosed with an ASD have been misdiagnosed and consequently that 
medical understandings of ASDs are limited.  
 
This limited understanding leads into the third difficulty: a lack of 
“good” evidence (that is, randomised controlled trials (RCTs)) 
supporting diagnostic techniques and the effectiveness of treatment 
interventions (Willaims & Brayne 2006; Mesibov 2006). The guidelines 
and tools used in the diagnosis of ASDs are based on this “weaker” 
evidence (that is, case-control studies and case series which do not have 
the same validity and reliability as RCTs), and from a medical 
perspective: “such guidelines are only as robust as the evidence on which 
they are based” (Cass et al 2006). Furthermore, there is a wide variety of 
assessment approaches and tools used amongst professionals in the 
diagnosis of ASDs. This has prompted calls from medical bodies, such as 
the Royal Australasian College of Physicians (RACP), for a “consensus 
approach to the diagnosis of ASDs” (Silove et al 2008). Other articles 
have stressed the importance of taking a “rational” and “standardised” 
approach to the medical investigation of ASDs (see Cass et al 2006; 
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Shattuck Grosse 2007). The focus of such literature lies with the hope of 
one day developing appropriate interventions and methods that meet the 
standards of “good evidence” (RCTs). This study, however, will explore 
this tension between applying statistical evidence versus the use of 
clinical judgement to diagnose and treat ASDs. Furthermore, it will 
concentrate on understanding the social and political forces that affect 
medical practice, especially the use of EBM and its instruments, when 
working with the ASD patient and their family.  
 
Evidence-based medicine: Replacing mess with order 
The uncertainty surrounding the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs within 
the medical arena has given rise to much debate within health-care 
literature as to how this disorder can be conceptualised and tested both 
theoretically and practically in a more rigorous, reliable, and valid 
manner (see McClure & Le Couteur 2007; Myers et al 2007; Rogers & 
Vismara 2008; Shattuck & Grosse 2007; and Mesibov et al 2006). 
However, uncertainty in medical practice is not only confined to 
heterogeneous disorders such as autism. Many articles (within the 
discipline of medicine and health care) criticising medical practice during 
the 1980s and 1990s, argued that there were large variations in the 
judgments and decisions made by clinicians (for example, Brook et al 
1988; Eddy 1990; and Wennberg 1984). Clinicians, they argue, tend to 
rely on their clinical experience: a “notoriously misleading” resource 
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(Eddy 1990 in Berg 1998: 226). A further criticism levelled at medical 
practice is a lack of uniformity and inability to articulate the logic behind 
clinical judgements or decisions (Berg 1998).  Evidence-based medicine 
(EBM) presents itself as a solution to these problems within the medical 
profession (Phillips et al 1999).  
 
Evidence-based medicine is understood as “the conscientious, explicit, 
and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the 
care of individual patients” (Sackett & Rosenberg 1995). Proponents of 
EBM embrace an epidemiological model of medicine, rather than 
pathophysiological models which base claims on experience and 
expertise (this distinction is discussed further in Chapter Two). EBM is 
disseminated in practice through clinical practice guidelines and 
standardised tools. These media aim to describe and enforce “good 
clinical reasoning” as well as provide a “vehicle through which order can 
be brought to all those practices where messiness reigns” (Berg 1998: 
227). Clinical protocols/guidelines, which are based on current scientific 
research, aim to bring about greater compliance and uniformity within 
medical practice. These changes to medical practice are thus seen as an 
“optimal solution to the ‘unscientific’ state of current medical practice” 
(Berg 1998: 227). The DSM-IV-TR is the diagnostic guideline most used 
to identify ASDs, and there are numerous tools used in medical practice 
to aid in the diagnostic process (for example, the Autism Diagnostic 
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Observation Schedule (ADOS), Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) 
and Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R)). 
 
Using EBM in medical practice involves the evaluation and application 
of evidence. Evaluation of the evidence is based on the evidence 
hierarchy, which ranks research according to its validity (Evans 2003). 
The evidence hierarchy places randomised controlled trials (RCTs) above 
cohort studies, which in turn are ranked above case-control studies and 
case series (Borgerson 2009). At the very bottom of this hierarchy lies 
expert opinion. The ranking of evidence is based upon error and bias in 
results. RCTs minimise the risk of confounding factors influencing 
results, and as a result produce findings that are closer to the true effect 
than the findings generated by methods such as cohort studies or case 
series (Evans 2003).  
 
Timmermans and Berg (2003) point out that discussions (see Gordon 
1988; Willaims & Garner 2002; and Cabana et al 1999) regarding the 
introduction and use of EBM, tools and guidelines in medical practice 
“abound with images of domination and oppression” (69) due to these 
tools apparently usurping the determination of health-care workers’ paths 
of action. However, Timmermans and Berg (2003) highlight that, based 
on their empirical investigations of the medical profession, 
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For all those involved, the guideline is not a goal in itself but a means, 
acted upon in terms of their own aims and the local constraints 
structuring the situation in which the guideline happens to be placed. 
(Timmermans & Berg 2003: 70) 
 
 
Thus, health-workers are active in this process of engagement with the 
tools of EBM: they do not necessarily submit to the tools, but “actively 
and deliberately make the guidelines work for them” (Timmermans and 
Berg 2003: 70). According to this perspective, the tools of EBM are 
ultimately used to the health-care worker’s advantage and to advance 
their own “professional trajectories”. For example, Timmermans and 
Berg (2003) call attention to the real reasons clinicians use EBM: that is, 
not to practice “better” science but, more pragmatically, to “figure out 
what kind of evidence might be appropriate in dealing with patients” 
(165). In Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) study involving interviews 
with paediatric residents, we see that: 
 
The proposed problem for which EBM is the solution does not match 
the reality of learning to doctor. Residents generally do not agonize as 
much about variability or dehumanizing care as they worry about 
getting through the residency without killing patients, completely 
exhausting themselves, accumulating negative evaluations, or getting 
sued. (Timmermans & Berg 2003: 165)  
 
 
However, this process of “standards-tinkering” does not imply that 
health-care workers are necessarily resisting their presence. Rather, 
interactions between health-care workers and standards are “mutually 
transforming,” whereby elements of evidence and medical expertise are 
used in the clinical encounter (Timmermans & Berg 2003: 76). This 
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examination of the role of clinical tools and guidelines within the medical 
profession breaks down traditional dichotomies set up in the literature 
between the efficiency and rationality created by tools and the creativity 
of clinical experience and judgement. The two are presented as mutually 
exclusive in medical practice. Timmermans and Berg (2003) instead 
argue it is a process of active negotiation and interaction between 
guidelines/tools and the health-care worker.  
 
The clinical encounter: A medicine full of tensions 
This process of “standards-tinkering” is particularly interesting when 
dealing with ASDs. Physicians must attempt to manage the tension 
between pressures to apply evidence in practice and the intersubjective, 
experiential-based evaluation of a heterogeneous disorder. This is a 
difficulty that is explicitly discussed by health-care workers in the 
literature (see Mesibov et al 2006; Dawson et al 1998). Despite this 
understanding of the complexity of medical practice, health-care 
professionals treat this tension as a problem that must be addressed and 
rectified. Mesibov and colleagues (2006) claim: 
 
…the traditional research methods emphasizing randomized 
assignment to groups, stringent control groups, and blind evaluations 
of treatment progress just don’t fit as neatly into autism treatment 
research as they do for biomedical or pharmacological interventions. 
My hope for the next decade is that we will develop more appropriate 
and responsive treatment intervention approaches that will meet the 
standards for scientifically rigorous research on treatments and autism. 
(Mesibov at al 2006: 7).  
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This “hope” is conveyed in much of the health-care literature cited 
above, yet Mesibov and colleagues (2006), in the quote above, 
unconsciously illuminate the very paradox or tension that exists within 
the medical profession. ASDs do not fit the mould of “traditional 
research methods” due to the nature of the disorder: it has no biological 
markers, it is a heterogeneous disorder, diagnosis is based on observed 
behaviours, and its treatment is usually therapy-based. The medical 
profession’s solution to the problem—developing better and “more 
appropriate” evidence—is the very reason the tension exists. Dawson and 
colleagues (1998) explain this tension, demonstrating that doctors are 
conscious of the complexity and uncertainty of much medical decision 
making. Thus, it is difficult for doctors to apply EBM in circumstances 
where they are dealing with heterogeneous conditions and comorbidity, 
and are compelled to consider socio-economic factors affecting the 
patient. One of Dawson and colleagues’ (1998) participants argues: 
 
I think [EBM] is a complete hoax personally...trials are done on such 
specific, clean questions but they never quite apply to the patient in 
front of you...I think that is the problem with practice at my level – it is 
very individual. That is why I don’t agree with EBM: there isn’t any 
evidence to help you deal with the difficult patient. (Dawson et al 
1998: 21) 
 
 
This quotation provides an apt example of the difficulty of using EBM in 
the clinical encounter. EBM is described as a paradigm shift in medicine 
because it is about “creating a culture where medical practitioners 
automatically think in an ‘evidence’-based way every time they see a 
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new case, where it becomes instinctive to seek out research evidence and 
base treatment decisions on that evidence” (Dopson et al 2003). Thus, 
health-care workers seeing patients on a daily basis are expected to 
embrace this paradigm, even when dealing with a “difficult patient”. 
Despite health-care professionals’ overt recognition and understanding of 
these perceived problems that are inherent to autism itself, the square peg 
of disorders such as ASDs continues to be forced into the round hole of 
EBM. It is therefore important to understand how these clinicians justify 
such practices and reconcile these tensions.  
 
Berg and Mol (1998) further illuminate this tension. They state that 
academic discussions surrounding the health-care domain often  
 
take unity to be the norm against which variety must be measured and 
discarded. They take diversity to be a temporary state that may be 
overcome through such things as evaluation studies, protocols, and the 
standardization of terminology. (Berg & Mol 1998: 7)  
 
 
Berg and Mol (1998) suggest instead that diversity—whether it is 
problematic or non-problematic; good or bad—is stable and is an 
inevitable part of any complex practice. They suggest it is futile to try to 
counter this diversity, and practitioners instead should try to understand 
the “politics inside medicine”. They state: “A medicine full of tensions 
contains politics, in the way that disease is established, the body is 
touched, patients are treated, cells are counted, and problems are solved” 
(Berg & Mol 1998: 8). Thus, the differences that exist in medicine can be 
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seen as distinctly social: the medical world is a social world, even the 
rational, scientific knowledge that forms the basis of its epistemology is 
subject to the political and social forces present within the boundaries it 
has established for itself.  
 
A satirical article titled ‘Seven alternatives to evidence based medicine’ 
by two Australian physicians further contributes to the social nature of 
medical practice (Isaacs & Fitzgerald 1999). It may also provide insight 
into the attitudes of Australian developmental paediatricians towards the 
use of EBM in the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs. The article outlines 
seven competing motivations (and personalities) in decision-making that 
EBM must contend with (see table below) based on what their colleagues 
would do when “faced with a clinical problem for which there are no 
randomised controlled trials and no good evidence” (Isaacs & Fitzgerald 
1999: 1618).  
 
Basis of clinical practice (extracted from Isaacs & Fitzgerald 1999: 1618).  
Basis for 
clinical 
decisions 
Marker Measuring device Unit of 
measurement 
Evidence Randomised controlled 
trial 
Meta-analysis Odds ratio 
Eminence  Radiance of white hair Luminometer Optical 
density 
Vehemence  Level of stridency Audiometer Decibels 
Eloquence Smoothness of tongue or 
nap of suit 
Teflometer Adhesion 
score 
Providence  Level of religious fervour Sextant to measure 
angle of genuflection  
International 
units of piety 
Diffidence Level of gloom Nihilometer  Sighs 
Nervousness Litigation phobia level Every conceivable 
test 
Bank balance 
Confidence* Bravado  Sweat test No sweat 
*Applied only to surgeons 
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This is exactly the problem faced by medical practitioners dealing with 
ASDs. While the article is a spoof, it does have a serious message: 
“There are plenty of alternatives for the practicing physician in the 
absence of evidence. This is what makes medicine an art as well as a 
science” (1618). When dealing with disorders such as autism where there 
is no clear professional consensus as to how to diagnose and treat 
patients, it is important to understand how physicians proceed with 
diagnosis and treatment in the clinical encounter.  
 
This tacit nature and socially-affected view of medical practice is perhaps 
best summarised by Wenger (1998): 
 
[Practice]...includes all the implicit relations, tacit conventions, subtle 
cues, untold rules of thumb, recognizable intuitions, specific 
perceptions, well-tuned sensitivities, embodied understandings, 
underlying assumptions and shared world views. Most of these may 
never be articulated, yet they are unmistakable signs of membership in 
communities of practice and are crucial to the success of their 
enterprises. (Wenger 1998: 47)  
 
 
Thus, this study seeks to make sense of the tacit and experiential nature 
of the clinical encounter with regards to ASDs. It also aims to understand 
at what point, and to what extent, the tacit and experiential nature of 
medical practice and the use of clinical tools and guidelines interact.  
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Considering ASDs: Why they warrant investigation within the social 
sciences 
This thesis does not endeavour to point out that the medical practice of 
diagnosing and treating ASDs lacks something; that if it were a truly 
‘scientific’ practice one would see coherence, consensus and uniformity. 
This study instead seeks to understand the incoherencies, complexities, 
and uncertainties faced by Australian paediatricians in private practice 
and how these inform medical knowledge and practice. Furthermore, this 
study focuses on understanding the ways in which paediatricians 
reconcile the tensions between EBM approaches and the complexities 
surrounding ASDs. As Berg and Mol (1998) so aptly state: “medicine 
doesn’t fail to meet the standards: the standards fail to meet reality” (10). 
 
As it stands, the practice of diagnosing and recommending treatments for 
ASDs within the field of Australian paediatrics in a private practice 
setting (that is, the medical setting in which most children with an ASD 
are diagnosed) does not necessitate the use of any particular tools or 
protocols. While paediatricians are expected to be familiar with the 
DSM-IV-TR and its diagnostic categories, they are not required to use 
any formal tools or guidelines (Silove et al 2008). Many ASD diagnostic 
tools have been developed, such as the ADOS and ADI-R, and are 
presumably used by paediatricians to aid them in the diagnosis of ASDs. 
However, how they are used, to what extent they are used, when they are 
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used, why they are used, and whether any are more consistently used  are 
all questions that are yet to be addressed within the literature. Likewise, 
understandings of the motivations and clinical reasoning behind the 
recommendations made by paediatricians in regards to ASD treatment 
approaches to use are limited.  
 
Research questions 
The overall aim of this study is to understand the ways paediatricians 
reconcile the tensions between evidence-based medicine approaches and 
the complexity of identifying and treating autism spectrum disorders.  
 
This study specifically aims to: 
• Understand how Australian paediatricians within a private practice 
setting use evidence-based medicine, standardised tools, and practice 
guidelines in the diagnosis and treatment of autism spectrum 
disorders; 
• Understand Australian private practice paediatricians’ attitudes 
towards evidenced-based medicine in both a theoretical and practical 
sense;  
• Determine whether EBM and its associated tools are in fact 
regularising or standardising the diagnosis of, and recommendation of 
treatments for, ASDs; and 
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• Determine whether there is consensus among Australian 
paediatricians in private practice as to the diagnosis of, and 
recommendation of treatment for, ASDs.  
 
The structure of this thesis 
The second chapter summarises the extensive field of literature within 
which this study is situated. It reviews key theoretical and empirical 
investigations of evidence-based medicine and examines absences in the 
literature. The third chapter discusses how this study will proceed and 
outlines the methodology of this analysis. Chapter four discusses the 
significant trends and issues that emerge from the interviews conducted 
with nine Australian paediatricians and links these findings with the 
theoretical work discussed in chapter two. In doing so, this chapter 
develops a sociological picture of the clinical encounter within the 
Australian paediatric private practice and its negotiations with EBM and 
its associated tools. The conclusion explores the implications of this 
study for research into paediatrics, evidence-based medicine, and private 
practice within Australia and suggests how this research might proceed.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
THE CHANGING KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURE OF THE 
MEDICAL PROFESSION AND THE IMPACT OF THE 
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE MOVEMENT  
 
 
Introduction: Engagement with theory 
The literature examining evidence-based medicine is diverse and inter-
disciplinary. It delves into a range of academic disciplines, including 
medicine, anthropology, sociology, information technology, psychology, 
public administration, business, government policy and management; and 
deals with issues such as quality and safety, objectivity, mediating 
cultural boundaries within hospitals, legal and political considerations, 
autonomy, and bureaucratic accountability. This variety indicates the 
complex nature of medical practice when it comes to EBM: It appears 
that medicine as a profession is not only answering to the bureaucratic 
structures within its boundaries, but that these boundaries have broken 
down and the medical profession must now answer to a plethora of 
different groups each with their own interest in how medical practice 
should be carried out. This has interesting implications for sociologists 
interested in understanding and investigating the complexities of medical 
practice today.  
 
This chapter will begin by examining Foucault’s (1975) Birth of the 
Clinic and his concept of the medical “gaze,” and will demonstrate that 
these ideas provide an interesting framework through which to 
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conceptualise epistemological changes in medicine. Secondly, this 
chapter will present a historical overview of the changes that have 
occurred in the knowledge-base and epistemology of the medical 
profession. This will include an examination of the rise of 
standardisation in medical practice, and the rise of evidence-based 
medicine. Thirdly, this chapter will consider the implications of 
sociological empirical contributions to the literature examining the place 
of EBM within medical practice. Finally, these discussions will be drawn 
together to explain the importance of investigating autism spectrum 
disorders within this context.  
 
Foucault and the medical “gaze”  
Foucault’s (1975) Birth of the Clinic presents the clinic not only as a 
place where medicine is practiced, but also a discursive practice: 
“because it is a set of rules and procedures within a field of inquiry that 
make possible a link between health and knowledge” (Long 1992: 119).  
For Foucault, the birth of modern medicine in the eighteenth century was 
not “an act of psychological or epistemological purification” whereby a 
linear progression in knowledge led to a true understanding of the nature 
of body and disease; rather, it involved a “syntactical reorganisation of 
disease” whereby a shift in the structure of medical knowledge led to an 
“epistemological rupture” (Foucault 1975 in Long 1992: 120).  
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This epistemological rupture involved “scientific medicine” or a 
“medicine of tissues” replacing a “medicine of symptoms” (Long 1992: 
119). The medical practice of the autopsy made the previously invisible 
visible and allowed doctors to describe and express this knowledge. 
Thus, the “code of knowledge changed” and in doing so determined what 
could be seen by the medical profession (Long 1992). This notion of 
what doctors see or a way of seeing is referred to as the medical “gaze” 
(Foucault 1975). It could be argued that this way of seeing within the 
medical profession has undergone another recent change, with the 
epistemological shift from pathophysiology to epidemiology. 
Pathophysiology refers to the changes in the physical and biochemical 
functions of the body that are associated with a disease or syndrome, 
whereas epidemiology refers to the study of factors affecting the health 
and illness of populations.  This epidemiological “gaze” entails the use of 
tools or guidelines based on statistical evidence to justify medical 
practice. 
 
While Foucault (1975) stresses that the clinical “gaze” moved from “the 
symptomatic surface to the tissual depth” (135) with the birth of modern 
medicine, it is important to recognise that the medicine of tissues 
sometimes does not apply to certain disorders or illnesses.  For instance, 
doctors’ “tissual gazes” cannot be applied to patients with disorders (such 
as chronic fatigue syndrome) that lack a biological marker or test to aid 
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in their diagnosis and treatment. This too is the case in the apparent shift 
from pathophysiology to epidemiology: if there are no biological markers 
or tests it becomes more challenging to carry out empirical investigations 
using randomised controlled trials (RCTs) (the ‘gold standard’ in the 
hierarchy of evidence). As discussed in Chapter One, ASDs are a case in 
point. Arnold and colleagues (2000) explain this difficulty of applying 
RCTs to research involving patients with an ASD as follows: 
 
The broad spectrum of pathology encompassed and the wide 
individual variation in symptomatic expression (sample heterogeneity) 
and treatment response challenge the sensitivity, psychometric 
properties, and/or assumptions of most instruments and assessment 
strategies commonly used in RCTs. (Arnold et al 2000: 100)  
 
Thus, ASD is described as a heterogeneous disorder due to the inter-
subject or inter-patient variability (that is, the wide array of ASD 
symptoms that can present differently in each patient) in genetic, 
neurobiological and clinical characteristics as well as in the response to 
treatment (Arnold et al 2000; Drew 2002). Furthermore, RCTs are 
difficult to apply to ASD research due to the heavy emphasis placed on 
direct observation in studies examining both diagnosis and treatment. 
Attempts to standardise observational practices, however, are largely 
ineffective (see Arnold et al 2000). Thus, empirical investigation into the 
way in which paediatricians direct the medical “gaze” towards patients 
whom they suspect are on the autism spectrum would provide further 
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insight into this Foucauldian concept as well as the management of 
heterogeneous cases within clinical practice.   
 
Foucault’s (1975) ideas regarding the medical “gaze” provide an 
interesting framework through which to examine the epistemological 
changes that have taken place within the medical profession. Chapter 
One demonstrates that the medical “gaze” encompasses the complexities 
of, and tensions within, medical practice. Not only does this medical 
“gaze” incorporate the epistemology of epidemiology, where 
standardisation and scientific rigour are upheld as ideal medical practice, 
but also elements of the social world, such as the uncertainties, 
complexities and incoherencies of medical practice. Understanding the 
nature of this epistemological change in medicine will provide a clearer 
picture of what entails the medical “gaze” within the medical profession 
today. However, before examining epidemiological medical practice (that 
is, EBM), it is necessary to first consider the founding ideas of this 
paradigm. Classification and standardisation provide an interesting 
backdrop to discussions regarding evidence-based medicine and 
represent an important change within scientific and medical knowledge 
structures.  
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Standardisation in medicine 
Classification, objectification and standardisation have made the practice 
of modern medicine possible, shaping it into the discipline it is today. 
According to Bowker and Star (1999), the term classification refers to a 
“spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal segmentation of the world,” while 
a classification system refers to a “set of boxes (metaphorical or literal) 
into which things can be put to then do some kind of work—bureaucratic 
or knowledge production” (10). Standards endeavour to make actions 
comparable over time and space and are described as “mobile and stable” 
(Timmermans & Berg 1997: 273).  Bowker and Star’s (1999) definition 
of the term standards is more complex and involves six elements: they 
are a set of agreed upon rules; they transcend place and time; they 
operate within and between different contexts (for example, the creation 
of a link between the phone and the computer); they are often enforced 
by the law; standards in use do not necessarily represent the ‘best’ 
standards; and they are often difficult and expensive to alter. 
 
More specifically, within a contemporary medical context, Timmermans 
and Berg (2003) distinguish four ideal typical categories of standards. 
The first category is labelled design standards, which are “structural 
specifications”, such as “the properties and features of X-ray devices” 
(24). The second category is terminological standards, which “ensure 
stability of meaning over different sites and times” and include 
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documents such as the International Classification of Diseases (25). The 
third category of standards is performance standards, which regulate 
professional work by “setting outcome specifications”. The fourth 
category is referred to as procedural standards, which take the form of 
clinical practice guidelines and “delineate a number of steps to be taken 
when specified conditions are met” (25).  
 
The key ideas forming the foundations of standardisation (that is, 
predictability, accountability, and objectivity produce universality) date 
back to the Enlightenment, and the notion that development and 
evolution of knowledge goes hand-in-hand with increased rationality and 
control (Timmermans & Berg 2003). But the beginnings of 
standardisation in medicine are pin-pointed to have taken place during 
the early twentieth century. At this time, the medical curriculum was 
changed and minimum standards were created, and these developments 
affected all hospitals across the United States (Timmermans & Berg 
2003). Several factors are cited for these changes. Firstly, care of patients 
became more complex because treatment was managed not only by the 
patients’ primary physician but also medical specialists. Secondly, the 
standardisation movement was fuelled by fears that if efficiency 
standards were not created within the profession, public officials would 
do it for them. Thirdly, there was a desire to make hospitals more 
financially responsible institutions (Timmermans & Berg 2003).  
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Following World War Two, standardisation in general established itself 
as a useful tool to “avoid direct political conflicts about barriers, 
inequities, and asymmetries in international trade and so a focus on 
standardization reemerged as the ‘product of a global economy’” 
(Timmermans & Berg 2003: 12). Interestingly, Timmermans and Berg 
(2003) point out that the historical motivations behind standardisation 
within the medical profession differed. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, standardisation was aimed at the skills, tools, and facilities 
required by clinicians: “the content of the work itself was left 
unaddressed: to decide the proper course of action for a given solution 
was the unique prerogative of the individual professional” (Timmermans 
& Berg: 13). However, during the 1980s, standardisation or evidence-
based medicine, focused on the content of the work itself – it aimed to 
regulate medical expertise and medical decision making (Timmermans & 
Berg 2003). The focus of standardisation in the medical profession today, 
in the form of EBM or clinical practice guidelines, is to “delineate what 
sequence of activities constitutes a professional response to a given 
situation” (13). Timmermans and Berg (2003) state:  
 
of all the kinds of standardization attempts that have affected medicine 
in the twentieth century, evidence-based guidelines represent the 
farthest-reaching and most direct attempt to prescribe and preset the 
actions of health care professionals. (Timmermans & Berg 2003: 14).  
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In recent times, standards remain central to the production of knowledge, 
with significant resources allocated to creating and maintaining standards 
(Latour 1987). The concept and process of standardisation is most 
commonly associated with scientific practice, and is one of the key 
criteria used to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific 
knowledge (Gottweis, Salter & Waldby 2009). Within the field of 
medical science, it is believed that to reliably build upon this scientific 
knowledge, uniform conditions need to be implemented across 
laboratories, researchers and technologies to ensure the credibility and 
stability of discovery (Gottwies et al 2009). Timmermans and Berg 
(2003) similarly emphasise the centrality of standardisation to scientific 
practice. They highlight that without agreed-upon rules, systems and 
benchmarks shared by various work environments, adequate comparisons 
cannot be made, rendering such work useless in terms of building 
scientific knowledge through collaboration. As Gottweis and colleagues 
(2009) state: “Standards bind communities of practice across space” 
(170) and thus allow consistency across geographical location and 
cultural context.  
 
However, it is important to recognise that standards cannot just be 
analysed as “technical artefacts” (Gottweis et al 2009). Rather, according 
to Gottwies and colleagues (2009), they are the product of negotiation, 
debate and compromise between bureaucratic bodies, scientific 
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communities, community groups, and the private sector. Therefore, they 
are always affected by the interests of these groups (Gottweis et al 2009). 
Within the medical profession, there is a particularly strong 
administrative focus and reliance on standards. Yet, Bowker and Star 
(1999) emphasise that medicine as a science has not developed as a 
linear progression of ideas resulting from increasing consensus due to 
this reliance on standards. Instead, they state that it has developed as a 
“panoply of tangled and crisscrossing classification schemes held 
together by an increasingly harassed and sprawling international public 
health bureaucracy” (Bowker & Star 1999: 21).  
 
Young (1995) (in Bowker and Star 1999) emphasises the complex nature 
of categories within medicine and psychiatry. He highlights that while 
psychiatrists communicate with each other using the language and 
categories of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), many do not 
believe in the categories they are using. Bowker and Star (1999) 
demonstrate how the objectivity of classifications and standards are often 
compromised within the medical profession due to, for example, human 
limitations—that is, “people do not do the ideal job, but the doable job” 
(Bowker & Star 1999: 24). Therefore, standards appear to lead a double-
life: their function in theory (that is, how they are discussed within the 
literature from a theoretical, versus empirical, perspective) and their 
function in practice. This study seeks to elaborate on this disparity 
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between the theoretical/discursive stance of the medical profession and 
the actual practice of medicine in the clinical encounter.  
 
Further adding to the complexity of standards and their use in medical 
practice, Timmermans and Berg (1997) introduce the idea of the 
“universality” of standards. They illustrate that it is the extension and 
transformation of networks already firmly in place that act as the 
essential ingredients to allow universality. The term “universality” within 
the context of medicine refers to the ability to apply, for example, a 
diagnostic test, across different hospitals and even countries without 
practice variation. The term “network” within this context refers to a 
means through which medical knowledge and practices can be made 
universal. Latour (1983) explains his conception of networks using the 
railway as an analogy: “Scientific facts are like trains, they do not work 
off their rails. You can extend the rails and connect them but you cannot 
drive a locomotive through a field” (in Timmermans & Berg 1997: 274). 
Thus, the rails (networks) are the means through which trains (scientific 
facts) are made to work across different settings (universality). An 
example of a network is clinical practice guidelines.  
 
This process of extending and transforming networks will of course 
create tensions as past infrastructures, procedures and practices are 
challenged. Timmermans and Berg (1997) emphasise that while 
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standards (such as clinical practice guidelines) are often portrayed as 
changing and replacing old practices, it is also important to see them as 
incorporating and extending already existing practices and routines. 
Furthermore, these authors stress that the universality of standards does 
not depend upon the presence of “centralized (scientific) control” (275), 
meaning that a standardised network does not require a “central actor” 
but rather “distributed activity” (275). This idea is illustrated through 
Timmermans and Berg’s (1997) analysis of an oncology protocol and the 
CPR protocol, in which they demonstrate that the origin of universal 
standards “is the result of historically situated, distributed work of a 
multitude of actors” (288). Thus, the concept of universality, as used by 
Timmermans and Berg (1997), emerges as quite precarious and 
uncertain, leading them to use the term “local universality” to address 
this ambiguity. They define local universality as follows: 
 
Local universality emphasizes that universality always rests on real-time 
work, and emerges from localized processes of negotiations and pre-
existing institutional, infrastructural, and material relations. 
‘Universality’, here, has become a non-transcendental term – no longer 
implying a rupture with the ‘local’, but transforming and emerging in 
and through it. (Timmermans & Berg 1997: 275).  
 
Timmermans and Berg’s (1997) work marks a significant contribution to 
discussions surrounding the use of standards within the medical 
profession, as it provides a practical critique of the notion of total 
bureaucratic supervision and control, such as “protocols render 
physicians’ skills superfluous”, “protocols can become a form of 
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‘tyrannical domination’”, and that doctors are reduced to “mindless 
cooks” (287). Their work emphasises that “it is the protocol’s trajectory 
which is secondary and which is aligned to [the physicians’] goals and 
trajectories” (Timmermans & Berg 1997: 288) and that “many years of 
experience or a strong familiarity with the literature supersedes following 
the protocol to the letter” (289). The agency of the patient in the clinical 
encounter further adds to this complex view of clinical guidelines and 
tools. Timmermans and Berg (2003) claim that sometimes the patient’s 
hopes and goals will affect the clinician’s use of the guidelines and tools: 
“patients will often negotiate their eligibility for a protocol” or skip 
elements of it “when they no longer see a meaningful link between their 
own future and the protocol’s trajectory” (71).  
 
Thus, to reconcile the patient’s wants and needs, the bureaucratic 
pressures to use EBM, and the physician’s own agenda, it is common for 
the physician to “tinker” with the protocol to make it workable in 
practice. Timmermans & Berg (1997) conclude that this is an 
acknowledged and accepted practice within the medical profession, 
stating: “Leaving the enrolled actors some leeway or discretion is often 
the preferred way to ensure their cooperation” (291). Considering the 
difficulty of applying EBM to the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs, it 
seems logical to assume that much “tinkering” with the diagnostic tools 
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and guidelines occurs, and likewise that experience may supersede the 
use of EBM and its instruments.  
 
The evidence-based medicine movement: Epidemiology in medical 
practice 
Timmermans and Berg (2003), amongst a plethora of other researchers 
(see for example: Aveyard 1997; Eddy 2005; Marshall 1997; 
Timmermans & Mauck 2005), identify three key figures as forming the 
foundations of what is now widely known as EBM: Archie Cochrane 
(1972), John Wennberg (1984) and David Sackett (1995). Archie 
Cochrane (1972) argues against the overuse of medical techniques that 
were not supported by reliable and valid evidence, that is, the RCT. He 
advocates the use of systematic reviews of RCTs on a given topic by 
clinicians so that they could have quick access to evidence supporting or 
negating a certain intervention. This evidence is based upon a hierarchy, 
as outlined in Chapter One. Such a database now exists and is called the 
Cochrane Collaboration. The second key founder of the concept of EBM 
is John Wennberg (1984), who demonstrates that medical interventions 
often vary according to geographical location. Reasons given for this 
variation are: inadequate medical knowledge, physician practice styles, 
patient preferences, over-reliance on inadequately verified diagnostic 
tools, and basic inequities in the health care system (Timmermans & 
Berg 2003). Ultimately, Wennberg’s contribution to the EBM movement 
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was the establishment of “optimal treatment levels”, which allowed 
government agencies and medical organisations to check treatment 
outcomes and allocate financial resources appropriately (Timmermans & 
Berg 2003: 15). The third figure discussed by Timmermans and Berg 
(2003) is David Sackett (1995), whose definition of EBM is most 
commonly quoted in the EBM literature (see Chapter One). Sackett 
contributed to methodological approaches to analysing data, and 
evaluating the scientific validity and merit of medical interventions, as 
well as coining and promoting the term “evidence-based medicine” and 
articulating its principles (Timmermans & Berg 2003). However, what 
brought about this need within the medical profession, during the late 
1980s, to change its epistemological framework from pathophysiology to 
epidemiology?  
 
This is a critical question that Timmermans and Berg (2003) address. The 
key response they give relates to society’s scepticism, at this time, 
towards the professional expert and the privileged power and knowledge 
that they hold. Essentially, the position of the autonomous medical 
professional had come under pressure due to rapidly escalating health 
care costs, an increasing awareness of practice variations, vast amounts 
of data generated by evolving technologies, and a general dissatisfaction 
within society regarding the role played by experts and professionals 
(Timmermans & Berg 2003). Thus, the medical profession realised the 
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need to act on these general feelings that were developing to maintain 
their status as professional experts and the “wielders of medical 
knowledge” (Timmermans & Berg 2003: 16) and ensure their 
professional survival.  
 
However, it has not just been the medical profession that has influenced 
the development of EBM. Four key groups are often identified as having 
an interest in the development of clinical guidelines: the medical 
profession, business or the private sector, the government, and insurance 
companies (Timmermans & Berg 2003). These four groups are also 
responsible for propelling the EBM movement forwards. The converging 
interests of these four parties have seen economic evaluations applied to 
the evidence, the results of which go on to affect the guidelines. For 
example, different interventions are not only judged based on their 
medical effectiveness but also on their financial cost. This can be seen in 
Australia through doctors prescribing medications listed under the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS). Medications listed under the 
PBS are subsidised by the Australian Government—for example, 
Risperidone is listed under the PBS and is often used in the treatment of 
behavioural symptoms of ASDs (such as aggression). However, the drugs 
listed under the PBS are arguably there due to “legal and political 
maneuvering” on the part of pharmaceutical companies (Rennie & Luft 
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2000: 2158), rather than their scientific merit. Rennie and Luft (2000) 
state: 
 
Pharmaceutical companies can be expected to continue to fund 
analyses of the cost-effectiveness of their products, and, as legal and 
political maneuvering in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia 
has shown, to continue to bring great political and legal pressure on the 
organizations responsible for deciding the relative merits of their 
products. (Schuchman 1999 and Wilkinson 1999 in Rennie & Luft 
2000: 2158).  
 
Much of the literature addressing what is sometimes described as a 
“paradigm shift in health care” (Timmermans & Berg 2003) has been 
divided into supporters (see Sackett et al 1996; Rosenberg & Donald 
1995) and critics (see Mykhalovskiy & Wier 2004; Smith & Pell 2003; 
Timmermans & Kolker 2004) of EBM. The supporters of EBM claim 
that standardisation is essential for effective communication and 
collaboration within the medical profession as it assists transparency in 
practice and moves medicine in the direction of an “exact science” 
(Rosoff 2001 in Timmermans & Berg 2003: 19). The critics of EBM 
claim that it turns medical practice into “cookbook” medicine, reducing 
practice to simple rule-following and thus undermining the experience 
and clinical expertise of each individual physician. A frequently 
discussed issue that has arisen from such debates relates to medical 
professionals’ compliance with clinical practice guidelines and thus the 
overall aims of EBM. Timmermans and Berg (2003) state:  
 
One of the great attractions and weaknesses of evidence-based 
medicine is that while experts might have decided what is best, it 
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remains up to the professionals to acquaint themselves with the clinical 
guidelines and follow the consolidated advice. (Timmermans & Berg 
2003: 21)  
 
These ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ EBM discussions are played out predominantly in 
the medical literature, whereas sociological examinations of EBM focus 
on explaining the processes that have caused this ‘paradigm shift’ in 
medicine, and understanding how (and whether) this ‘paradigm shift’ has 
changed the practice of medicine. Some of these sociological studies are 
discussed in Chapter One. The following section discusses five 
exemplary qualitative studies in varying contexts and within different 
sub-disciplines (for example, general medicine doctors, nurses, paediatric 
residents) examining the use of EBM in the clinical encounter.  
 
The reality of medical practice: A review of the empirical literature 
The recent empirical research within the sociology of the medical 
profession demonstrates that clinical practice is a complex and 
disorganised affair. This complexity is evidenced by many empirical 
(sociological) investigations of a variety of medical specialisations as 
well as general medical practice. This discussion concentrates on recent 
(post-2000) sociological contributions to understandings of EBM. Five 
exemplary studies are evaluated: two examining general perceptions and 
opinions of medical staff; one investigating perceptions and opinions of 
medical staff within an Australian context; and two illustrating the 
perceptions and opinions of paediatricians. 
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McDonald, Waring and Harrison (2006) provide an examination of the 
attitudes of hospital doctors and managers to the implementation of rules 
in the context of patient safety. Their findings suggested a clash between 
the values of managerialism and medicine, highlighting that the doctors’ 
narratives were centrally concerned with the rejection of the discourse 
and rules of standardisation: “doctors’ accounts suggest that the rule is 
‘there are no rules’” (McDonald et al 2006: 194). McDonald and 
colleagues (2006) point to social norms and values present both within 
and outside of the medical world as causes of these attitudes. Thus, 
within the context of medicine: 
 
The unwritten rules of medical practice suggest that doctors whose 
practice is closely governed by guidelines, or who comment critically 
on the work of other medical professionals, will no longer be regarded 
as doctors, since autonomy and a refusal to judge others are key 
elements of the medical identity. (Hunter 1991 as cited by McDonald 
et al 2006: 198);  
 
 
And within the broader social context: 
 
The fact that doctors command greater popular support and enjoy 
much higher levels of trust amongst the general public than do hospital 
‘bureaucrats’ contributes to their ability to resist challenges to their 
autonomy. (McDonald et al 2006: 198) 
 
 
Furthermore, in another study conducted by McDonald and colleagues 
(2005), in which the perspectives of nurses and doctors regarding clinical 
guidelines were compared, it was found that doctors and nurses adopt 
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and promote the collective values of the particular profession in which 
they have been socialised. Thus, while nurses emphasised the importance 
of following guidelines and standardised approaches to ensure patient 
safety, doctors stressed the need for flexibility in the face of 
unpredictability and emphasised the tacit nature of their knowledge 
through experience. In fact, doctors claimed that they did not “identify 
with” certain standards, nor regard them to be “legitimate,” and thus did 
not follow them. Here, again, one sees the distinctly social-side of 
medical practice emerging, as well as the process of “standards 
tinkering”.  
 
Hester-Moore (2005) interviewed fourteen health practitioners (10 
doctors, 4 nurses) about their management of decreased libido in her 
exploration of the tension between the use of standards/guidelines and 
the requirements of clinical practice. She demonstrates that both the 
guidelines and practitioners’ experience are involved in a “transformative 
process” while clinical decision-making is enacted (184). She highlights 
that the guidelines and the health practitioners’ translations of the 
guidelines into “‘doable’ everyday practice” are “mutually shaped and 
shaping, constructed by and constructing, social phenomena.” (184) This 
notion of negotiating or tinkering with EBM and its instruments appears 
to be a theme within sociological examinations of EBM. Additionally, 
Hester-Moore’s study, as well as the other studies discusses in this 
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section, avoid a conceptual difficulty that Timmermans and Berg (2003) 
discuss with reference to theoretical examinations of EBM. This 
conceptual difficulty reinforces the distinction between experience (or 
clinical judgement) and the use of EBM and its instruments 
(Timmermans & Berg 2003). Perpetuating this binary avoids recognising 
the true complexities and intricacies of medical practice: the act of 
negotiating in and between guidelines, experience, and clients.  
 
Rafalovich (2005) interviewed twenty-six clinicians (including 
paediatricians) about their diagnosis and treatment of attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children. He claims that clinicians 
have reservations about the diagnostic validity of the DSM-IV, 
highlighting that the application of this guideline in the clinical setting 
requires negotiation on the part of the clinician in terms of using clinical 
judgement to aid in decision-making. Furthermore, the study stresses that 
the clinicians are not practicing in a vacuum, but are instead largely 
affected by the scepticism (and thus subjective interpretations) that 
surrounds ADHD, both within the medical community and expressed in 
society at large (for example, in the media). Rafalovich states: 
 
Hence, the ambivalence elucidated in this study may demonstrate the 
reflexivity between clinical realms and the broader discursive contexts 
that affect, and are affected by, such realms. As the diagnostic 
category of ADHD and its most conventional methods of treatment 
remain mired in debate, the many points of contention that characterise 
the modern discussion of ADHD may become visible in the way 
clinicians realise their professional aims. (Rafalovich 2005: 318) 
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Again, this study accentuates the role of the social world in affecting the 
clinician in the clinical encounter. It is also particularly valuable as it 
examines the application of the DSM-IV in the clinical encounter – the 
guideline used by paediatricians to diagnose ASDs. Furthermore, ASDs 
and ADHD can exist simultaneously in one patient (comorbidity), and 
thus children diagnosed with an ASD will sometimes also be affected by 
ADHD. These results, then, could have implications for this study.  
 
Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) study (also discussed in Timmermans 
& Berg 2003), in which paediatric residents are interviewed about their 
use of EBM in clinical decisions, aims to empirically investigate the 
extent to which EBM has altered medical training. Ultimately, it shows 
that “the political and ontological effects of EBM...subtly change the 
interrelationship between people and their tools of knowledge” 
(Timmermans & Berg 2003: 143). Timmermans and Berg (2003) state:  
 
An EBM medical practice will differ depending on what kind of 
research qualifies as evidence and the different clinical situations it 
pertains to. In order to qualify as EBM, should the resident reserve 
literature consultations for rare, difficult, and new cases, or especially 
for routine patient actions? What literature qualifies as solid evidence, 
and how should it be read? When can a resident who believes in EBM 
assume that he or she knows the evidence and skip consulting the 
literature? (Timmermans & Berg 2003: 145)  
 
Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) research, in which these questions are 
addressed, show that there are at least two very different ways of “doing 
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EBM”, and these are embodied in the “librarian” and the “researcher” 
approaches (345). The majority of the participants in their study fulfilled 
the criteria of librarian, with the main difference between the approaches 
relating to researchers evaluating the literature based on randomised 
controlled trials and librarians consulting any literature.  Thus, a key 
factor in doing EBM involves awareness of the evidence hierarchy. This 
distinguishing factor between participants could have implications for 
this study. The Australian paediatricians interviewed could have differing 
conceptions as to what constitutes EBM based on independent variables 
such as length of time practicing as a paediatrician (that is, clinical 
experience).  
 
A further finding of Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) study is the power 
of clinical experience in the clinical encounter. Resident physicians (that 
is, people that have received their medical degree but are still involved in 
training) reported that in circumstances where they believe the 
attending’s (that is, a physician that acts as a supervisor to residents) 
clinical decision is at odds with the literature, and they approach the 
attending with the relevant evidence to discuss the case, the literature 
would likely lose out: “The attending would qualify the study’s findings 
with some reason why the recommendations did not apply in this 
particular case” (Timmermans & Berg 2003: 159). Timmermans and 
Berg (2003) go on to state:  
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Not only did residents confirm that their superiors’ institutionalized 
power advantage and accumulated experience trumped any knowledge 
they might have gleaned from the literature, but they also admitted that 
they would act similarly when others challenged them...[they would] 
“likely stick with experience”. (Timmermans & Berg 2003: 160)  
 
 
However, the conceptual difficulty of evidence and experience being 
viewed as distinct, even opposite, entities, as discussed above, does not 
apply to Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) study. The authors qualify 
that the participants ultimately indicate that medical practice “inevitably 
contained a mixture of the two, albeit not necessarily in equal 
proportions” (Timmermans & Berg 2003: 163-4). Thus, they state: 
 
The quality that guides clinical decision making is not the tradition-
bound experience put up as a straw person in the medical and 
sociological literature, but a mixture of skills and uncertainties 
grounded in medical knowledge. (Timmermans & Berg 2003: 163).  
 
 
The direction of this study 
In this chapter, I have discussed the paradigmatic shift that has taken 
place in the medical profession and how this has affected medical 
practice. This shift from pathophysiology to epidemiology, however, has 
not been a simple process. Three key factors are outlined as contributing 
to the complexity of medical practice today. First, the notion that 
standards lead a double-life, in that there is a disparity between the 
motivations of administrative and bureaucratic bodies developing 
standards/guidelines and the motivations of those that must apply them in 
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practice. Second, the idea that health-care workers do not do the ideal 
job, they do the “doable” job. This often involves “tinkering” with 
standards to make it workable in practice. Thus, the trajectory of a 
standard is second to the clinician’s goals. Third, the idea that standards 
and guidelines are affected by the interests of many groups external to 
the medical profession, such as government and industry. These factors 
suggest that the medical epidemiological “gaze” is not as rigorous, 
standardised, nor scientific as it often purports to be. In fact, the medical 
“gaze” appears to be affected by many political and social forces at work 
within the medical profession and outside of it.  
 
Investigating this complex conception of the medical “gaze” within the 
context of a disorder such as autism, surrounded by scientific uncertainty 
and medical complexities, therefore makes for an interesting study. 
Autism spectrum disorder, as discussed in Chapter One, is a 
heterogeneous disorder. Thus, ASDs’ causes, age of onset, symptoms, 
comorbidity with other disorders (such as ADHD), and patients’ 
responses to treatment all differ according to each patient. This sheer 
variability makes ASDs particularly difficult to test under the 
epidemiological paradigm, particularly using a RCT. Diagnosing and 
treating ASDs, as demonstrated in Chapter One, is carried out at an 
individual, case-by-case level and heavily relies on the clinician’s 
observation of the patient. While standardised tools and guidelines that 
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aid in the diagnosis of ASDs exist, it appears paediatricians are critical of 
their functionality in practice and that sometimes they are used 
incorrectly (Symons 2008). However, sociological investigations of the 
subtleties and complexities involved in the clinical encounter when 
dealing with a heterogeneous disorder such as autism are scarce (see 
Rafalovich 2005).   
 
Thus, an investigation of the paediatricians’ “gaze” and how it is applied 
in the clinical encounter to autism spectrum disorder will shed light on 
the inter-subjectivities, subtleties and complexities involved in medical 
practice. Such an investigation will provide greater understanding of 
what the “doable” job entails in the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs, the 
role standards play in the clinical encounter, and whether internal and/or 
external political and social forces affect the “gaze” of the paediatrician. 
In doing so, this study will hope to show that: 
 
The difficulty for medicine as a discipline is maybe not that this 
subjectivity is happening, but that the medical research tradition lacks 
strategies for the study of interpretive action, its dynamics and its 
consequences. (Malterud 2001: 397).  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Methodological approaches of sociological literature addressing the 
field of paediatrics 
To ascertain the scope and depth of sociological research within the field 
of paediatrics, and to shed light on the process of conducting interviews 
with medical professionals about the practice of medicine, a Sociological 
Abstracts (CSA) database search was performed early in the research 
process. The terms “paediatric” OR “pediatric” OR “paediatrician” OR 
“pediatrician” were searched within abstracts. This database search 
revealed that the field of paediatrics, whilst a popular topic of interest for 
sociologists in general, has not been properly explored in terms of 
understanding the practice of paediatrics and conducting field research 
with these professionals. Three studies investigating the way 
paediatricians practice within the hospital setting provided good 
examples of conducting field research within a paediatric clinical setting.  
 
In Fortin’s (2008) sociological examination of a paediatric clinic in 
Montreal, Canada, a “triple research method” is used. This research 
method is described as an “ethnographic approach” and involves 
observations of clinical work over a one year period, individual in-depth 
interviews with clinicians, and case studies of patients and their families. 
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This research approach was interested in discovering more about the 
dynamics of the clinical encounter within a hospital setting.  
 
In Hunter and colleagues’ (2008) sociological examination of critical 
incidents within a major paediatric hospital in Australia, the ethnographic 
approach is also embraced. The authors claim that “an anthropological 
ethnographic research approach enable[s] the researcher to observe, 
document, interpret and make sense of the activities of clinicians...[it] 
significantly exposes and highlights hospital dramas and shows the 
effects on clinicians’ everyday lives” (91).  
 
Timmermans & Angell’s (2001) study (see Chapter Two), involving in-
depth interviews with seventeen paediatric residents, aims to understand 
how the standardisation of medicine through the implementation of EBM 
and its instruments affects knowledge acquisition and medical practice. 
Of particular interest for Timmermans and Angell are how these 
paediatric residents are managing clinical uncertainty and whether this 
paradigm shift within the education setting is translated to the clinical 
practice setting. The interview questions used within this study were 
aimed at generating detailed stories, and the interviewers probed 
repeatedly for specific instances of clinical problem solving. Each 
respondent was asked similar questions, but not necessarily in the same 
wording and sequence. Timmermans and Angell (2001) claim that they 
62 
 
would have preferred to observe their participants while involved in 
clinical decision-making and during contact with patients. Importantly 
though, they stress that obtaining participants for the interviews was 
cumbersome enough: “Even with the blessing of the attending physician, 
it remained difficult and time-consuming to access the residency 
programs” (344). The recruitment process was also quite challenging in 
this study and will be discussed at length later in this chapter.  Thus, this 
generation of stories and probing for detailed clinical examples approach 
was an attempt to compensate for the limited methodological framework 
within which they were forced to work.   
 
Whilst these studies all contribute important empirical observations to 
sociological understandings of the field of paediatrics within the hospital 
setting, it is also important to understand the nature of paediatric clinical 
practice within a private practice setting. As discussed in Chapter One, 
children diagnosed with an ASD in Australia are usually diagnosed by a 
private practice paediatrician. However, there is a gap in sociological 
understandings of the paediatric private practice, as well as sociological 
understandings of how patients with an ASD are managed in the clinical 
encounter. Another trend that emerges within this literature is the 
research method of ethnography and observation, as well as the use of in-
depth interviews. This methodological consistency is important to 
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consider when formulating a research approach for sociological empirical 
investigations into the practice of medicine.  
 
Approach adopted for this study 
The observational and ethnographic approaches within health care 
settings have been described as “insightful and illuminating” (Mays & 
Pope 1995: 182). Mays and Pope (1995) claim that such an approach 
side-steps the discrepancy between what people say they do, and what 
they actually do: it “circumvents the biases inherent in the accounts 
people give of their actions caused by factors such as the wish to present 
themselves in a good light, differences in recall, selectivity, and the 
influences of the roles they occupy” (182). Furthermore, Polanyi’s (1983) 
work emphasises the tacit nature of human knowledge, that is, we know 
more than we can impart. Polanyi examines the “art” of the medical 
diagnosis as an example of this tacit knowledge. He describes the skilful 
testing and expert observation involved, yet doctors’ inability to 
explicitly explain the process. Whilst this approach clearly has many 
benefits, it is important to point out that the studies making use of this 
methodology are conducted within large-scale settings, such as hospitals. 
The scale of this study is far more modest due to time and resource 
limitations, and is interested in individual clinicians in a private clinical 
setting. Thus, it was decided that interviews would be an adequate 
methodological approach to gain the information needed for this study. 
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However, Mays & Pope’s (1995) point regarding the biases inherent in 
people’s accounts of their own actions will certainly be taken into 
account as a methodological weakness of this study.  
 
Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) methodological approach in their 
examination of paediatric residents’ use of EBM in the management of 
clinical uncertainty provided a good model for this study. Their work is a 
vital contribution to the sociological literature dealing with EBM, as it 
ties together the ideas of uncertainty in medical practice, differences in 
practice based on the experience of the doctor, and different approaches 
to doing EBM. Through their methodological approach, they were able to 
convey the complexities, subtleties and uncertainties encountered in 
medical practice. As outlined in Chapter One, the aims of this study are 
similar, and therefore Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) methodological 
approach appears to be a good way to test these objectives.  As a result, 
the interview questions used in Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) 
investigation were used as a guide for this study. These existing 
questions, and their investigation more generally, gave the researcher 
insight into paediatric practice through a sociological lens and provided a 
starting point in regards to the relevant questions to ask.  
 
The formulation of the interview questions for this study was thus based 
upon the information obtained from the Timmermans and Angell (2001) 
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study, a variety of articles examining the diagnosis and treatment of 
ASDs, and personal contact (through the researcher’s work with children 
diagnosed with an ASD) with parents of children diagnosed with an ASD 
and professionals diagnosing and treating ASDs.  
 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) 
Two ethics applications were submitted to the HREC. The first 
application required amendments to the recruitment process (that is, to 
provide a more detailed explanation as to how the study would recruit 
participants), the Ethics Administration telephone number, and some 
formatting details. The second application was submitted in the form of a 
letter that addressed the requested amendments. Ethics approval for this 
study was granted on 15 May 2009. The approval period to conduct this 
study was May 2009 to May 2010.  
 
Recruitment 
Participants were recruited using two different approaches:  
(1) The publication of a recruitment notice in the Royal Australasian 
College of Physicians’ (Paediatrics and Child Health Division) e-
bulletin on 29/05/2009. The recruitment notice requested 
interested persons to contact the researchers (whose details were 
provided) if they wished to participate in the study. Interested 
persons were then sent a ‘Participant Information Statement’, 
66 
 
‘Participant Consent Form’, and a self-addressed stamped 
envelope to be read, signed and returned to the researchers.  
(2) A recruitment letter posted on 22/06/09 to twenty-two 
paediatricians listed on the Yellow Pages website under 
“paediatric medicine” and “paediatricians”. This letter consisted 
of a ‘Recruitment Letter’, ‘Participant Information Statement’, 
‘Participant Consent Form’, and a self-addressed stamped 
envelope: potential participants were told that if they were 
interested in participating in the study, to read, sign and return the 
relevant documents to the researchers.  
 
In accordance with ethical guidelines, no pressure was placed on the 
paediatricians to respond. Paediatricians were also made aware that they 
could withdraw from the study at any time.  
 
The lack of response was not surprising given the caution in the literature 
that access to the ‘powerful’ or ‘elites’ can be difficult (Sarantakos 
2005). Due to the lack of respondents three weeks after recruitment 
approach (1), the researcher used recruitment approach (2) to increase the 
chances of obtaining interviews. This approach was more personal and 
had a greater likelihood of receiving the attention of the respondent as a 
result. Of the two recruitment methods used, two participants responded 
to the recruitment notice in the RACP’s e-bulletin, and eight responded 
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to the recruitment letter. Of these ten respondents that initially expressed 
interest in participating in the study, only one did not participate in the 
interviews because they did not respond to the researcher’s attempts to 
organise an interview time. This was a common problem with all of the 
respondents: once they had given their permission to be contacted by 
telephone to organise a time to be interviewed, each participant was 
contacted at least three times before a response was received. 
Interestingly, most participants spontaneously indicated to the 
interviewer that they participated in the study out of a sense of obligation 
(to the profession of Australian paediatrics, claiming this research was 
“relevant” and “important”) and/or interest in the research topic. Overall, 
the recruitment process took place over a period of eight weeks. 
 
Interviews 
Data collection took place over a period of seven weeks, beginning on 
June 29 2009 and ending on August 19. Interviews were audio-taped, 
conducted face-to-face in the paediatrician’s place of work. The average 
length of interviews was 26 minutes 56 seconds: with the shortest 
interview 16 minutes 39 seconds in duration; and the longest interview 
42 minutes 34 seconds in duration (see list of tables, Table 1). Each 
interview was transcribed verbatim.  
 
The interviews took the following structure: 
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The interviewer was greeted by the paediatrician in their 
reception/waiting area and then ushered into their office. The interviewer 
presented herself to participants formally, but also in a friendly and open 
manner. The paediatrician was provided with a consent form, participant 
information statement and a list of the questions to be asked in the 
interview (this provided them with a visual copy of the questions to refer 
to if they were side-tracked or went ‘off topic’ while answering) (see 
appendix 1). The interviewer then gave a brief outline of the research and 
its purpose and provided a brief outline of the interview structure. The 
interviewer also demonstrated her knowledge of, and interest in, the topic 
when introducing the interview, outlining her three years of experience 
working with children diagnosed with an ASD. By providing this 
information, the interviewer wished to convey her knowledge base within 
the area.  
 
The interviewer then presented the audio-recording device and again 
confirmed that it was okay for it to be used. The audio-recording device 
was switched on and the questions were asked in order. Six of the nine 
interviews were conducted without interruption, three however were 
interrupted by phone calls. In these cases the audio-recording device was 
switched off during the phone call and switched-on again at the phone 
call’s conclusion and the paediatrician’s confirmation that the interview 
could once again progress.  
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The interview schedule (see appendix 1) contained questions in relation 
to: 
(1) The paediatrician’s experience 
(2) The diagnosis of ASD:  
(a) at varying ages  
(b) problems encountered with the use of guidelines in diagnosis  
(c) whether a particular diagnostic tool was preferred over others.  
(3) The treatment of ASD: 
 (a) the clinical process a paediatrician goes through in 
recommending treatments 
 (b) difficulties encountered when recommending treatments 
(4) The use of EBM in paediatrics and in the diagnosis and treatment of 
ASD 
 (a) defining EBM 
 (b) education  
 (c) the use of literature searches in diagnosis and treatment 
 (d) the importance of EBM within Australian paediatrics  
 
The interviews conducted for this research can be described as semi-
structured (Sarantakos 2005): while a structured list of questions was 
followed in a certain order, probing was often used when the interviewer 
felt something interesting was mentioned and needed elaboration; when 
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something needed clarification; or if the interviewer felt that the question 
was not answered or understood by the interviewee. In the case of a 
question not being answered or understood the question was rephrased. 
All questions were “open” and the interview schedule was therefore 
“unstandardised” (Sarantakos 2005).  
 
The interviewer’s experience in working with children diagnosed with an 
ASD, as mentioned above, was very valuable during the interview 
process for two of reasons. Firstly, many of the standardised tools used to 
diagnose ASDs, as well as the treatments, are commonly discussed in 
acronym form. Thus, this experience over the years has brought the 
researcher into contact with such terminology, allowing the interview to 
progress without interruptions on the interviewer’s part for the 
interviewees to clarify acronyms and their meanings. Secondly, probing 
questions in semi-structured interviews is an important tool. The 
interviewer’s experience aided her background practical knowledge of 
ASDs and allowed her to formulate probing questions that drew on real-
life experiences of families with a child on the spectrum, health-care 
professionals diagnosing and treating ASDs, and children themselves on 
the autism spectrum. This certainly contributed to a more in-depth level 
of probing. 
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However, these ‘probing questions’ also improved as the researcher 
interviewed more paediatricians. Due to the marked absence of literature 
examining the use of EBM in the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs, the 
interview data provided many novel insights and raised many new 
questions in the mind of the interviewer. Thus, as the interviewer learnt 
more about the paediatricians’ roles in the diagnosis and treatment of 
ASDs through each interview, she was able to probe the paediatricians 
with a stronger knowledge base. This technique is known as ‘explication’ 
whereby “findings emerge through the study and are interpreted during 
the process of interviewing” (Sarantakos 2005: 270). 
 
Limitations of this approach 
There are some limitations in the data obtained from the interviews. 
Firstly, the small sample size of the study means that it is difficult to 
make inferences from the interviews extending beyond the interviews 
themselves. Timmermans and Angell (2001) similarly identify their small 
sample size as a significant limitation in their research approach: “[it] 
does not allow us to make fine distinctions along the lines of gender, 
race, medical sub-discipline, and year of residency—all potentially 
relevant independent variables” (345). This too is an important factor to 
consider within this study: because the sample size is nine, independent 
variables such as the paediatricians’ experience, where they were 
educated and trained, and their gender and race, cannot be adequately 
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examined and generalised. Secondly, the interviewees are considered 
“elites” and it is possible that they were guarded in their responses 
because they mistrusted how the responses would be used (Sarantakos 
2005). Thirdly, a common problem with interviews and any self-report 
data is the truthfulness of the answers (Sarantakos 2005). Within the 
context of this study, the interviewer was aware of relevance of the 
‘social standards’ bias, whereby respondents provide answers that may 
have been adjusted to conform to social standards, resulting in the 
researcher receiving answers that are socially desirable but not 
necessarily correct or accurate. Unfortunately, it is unclear within the 
literature what the cultural norms and values are within the context of the 
private paediatric clinic, thus it was hard to “ensure sensitive questions 
[were] formulated in a manner that neutralis[ed] external factors in 
interviewing” (Sarantakos 2005: 284). An important aim of this study is 
to address this gap in the literature, thus shedding light on the cultural 
norms and values that exist within this context. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ASDs AND THE CLINICAL ENCOUNTER: EXPERIENCE, 
TACIT KNOWLEDGE, TOOL “TINKERING”, AND THE 
INFLUENCE OF THE SOCIAL WORLD 
 
Analysis of the interviews revealed a number of issues, many of which 
have been discussed in the existing literature, but have yet to be 
understood within the context of private practice paediatrics and the 
diagnosis and treatment of ASDs. These issues include: the role of 
experience in the clinical encounter, the tacit and experiential nature of 
diagnosing and treating the heterogeneous condition of autism, the 
necessary practice of tool “tinkering” and tool negotiation, and the 
influence of political and social forces in the clinical encounter.  
 
Participants’ experience: an important independent variable 
The interviews in this study began by establishing the experience of the 
participants in terms of how many years they had been practicing as 
paediatricians. Due to the changes in medical epistemology (that is, the 
shift from pathophysiology to epidemiology and evidence-based practice) 
during the 1990s, the researcher anticipated that experience may be a 
crucial independent variable affecting participant responses. For instance, 
a participant with thirty or more years of experience, and therefore 
someone that conducted their training and initial practice prior to the 
EBM movement, may be expected to have very different responses from 
a participant that was educated and trained during the EBM movement. 
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Two clear groups were identified: four participants had 16 years or less 
experience, and five participants had 30 years or more experience (see 
list of tables, table 2).  Furthermore, all of the less experienced 
participants are female, and all of the more experienced participants are 
male. Unfortunately, the independent variable of gender cannot be 
explored in this study due to the small sample size.  
 
According to the Royal Australasian College of Physicians (RACP) 
(Paediatrics Division), the number of Paediatric Fellows that are 
members of the RACP in Australia is approximately 1500. Considering 
the specificity of this study, in that the paediatricians interviewed are 
practicing in the Sydney area, are developmental paediatricians, and have 
to have experience working with an autistic population; it is fair to say 
that the number of paediatricians meeting this criteria would be quite 
small. Unfortunately, this figure could not be obtained from the RACP.  
 
These divisions between less and more experienced participants will be 
discussed in this section to determine any differences in data based on 
this independent variable. Three key differences between groups one and 
two were identified: conceptualising EBM, using tools/guidelines in the 
diagnosis of ASDs, and prescribing medications. However, as discussed 
with regards to the independent variable of gender, due to the small 
sample size, any variation in data between less and more experienced 
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participants must be discussed cautiously and cannot be extrapolated to 
the larger Australian paediatric population.  
 
Conceptualising EBM 
Throughout their interviews, two of the more experienced participants 
conveyed an anti-EBM attitude when questioned specifically about EBM. 
Additionally, they did not mention EBM in general diagnostic and 
treatment questions. Upon further questioning, it was discovered that this 
attitude was related to the participants’ conceptualisations of EBM. They 
stated, respectively:  
 
I’m a book person, rather than a computer person – I prefer what’s in 
front of me than what’s on the screen...It’s just an age thing. 
 
...it just wasn’t necessary; it’s just a personal thing; we weren’t really 
taught much about autism when I was training in paediatrics, and it’s 
something I and my colleagues have had to pick up along the way. So 
the way it’s just happened for me, is through the reading of journal 
articles mainly, going to conferences, going to lectures and then, more 
or less, formulating my own approach, based on that information; and 
it’s an ongoing thing... 
 
 
Both these responses conveyed, in this researcher’s eyes, a 
misunderstanding about what is meant by the term EBM. Both 
participants appear to assume that EBM is specifically a computer 
resource, and seem to discount reading journals in a hard-copy format as 
forming part of EBM. From both these participants’ previous responses, 
it is fair to assume they do practice EBM, just not necessarily on a 
computer.  This resistance to, and discomfort with, the use of computers 
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to conduct EBM literature searches could be a widespread phenomena 
amongst physicians educated and trained prior to the 1990s. These 
physicians may not be as competent, nor familiar, with the Cochrane 
data-base and other computer-based EBM search tools as physicians who 
have been educated and trained over the past twenty years (that is, when 
EBM formed an important part of medical training and education). Thus, 
further investigations need to examine this possible discrepancy.  
 
Using tools/guidelines in the diagnosis of ASDs 
To ascertain whether there were educational differences between 
participants with regards to EBM, participants were explicitly asked 
about their education and training. While all four of the less experienced 
participants indicated that their education and training had involved 
learning about EBM, only one of the more experienced group claimed 
this was the case (see table 7). This data could account for differing 
responses between the two groups in terms of the use of EBM in the 
clinical encounter. All of the less experienced participants cited one or 
more diagnostic tool(s) used in their diagnosis of ASDs, whereas just one 
of the more experienced group mentioned the use of diagnostic tools or 
guidelines (see table 3). Thus, if the less experienced participants have 
been specifically educated and trained to use EBM, they will likely be 
more confident making use of it in medical practice and understanding its 
deficiencies. One of the more experienced participants, when questioned 
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about the importance of EBM and its instruments to the practice of 
paediatrics in Australia, stated: 
 
I know the answer to that is ‘very important’, because my daughter has 
just finished her post-graduate medical course and I’ve seen what she 
does with this stuff; I think it’s just a generational thing now; it’s just 
the way medicine is changing; and is it important? Of course it’s 
important. Do I use it? No! (laughs in a self-deprecatory manner) 
 
This quote illuminates a generational gap that appears to exist in medical 
practice. While the participant admits EBM is an important change that 
has affected medical practice, he matter-of-factly states that he does not 
use it. This attitude could be explained by McDonald and colleagues’ 
(2006) discussion of the social norms and values that exist within the 
medical profession (as discussed in Chapter Two).   
 
Prescribing medications 
Another trend that emerged between the two groups was the tendency of 
the more experienced participants to use pharmacological interventions 
in the treatment of ASDs than the less experienced participants (see table 
6). Four of the more experienced participants stated that they prescribed 
medications, whereas only one of the less experienced participants stated 
she did this. In fact, one of the more experienced participants stated: “I 
use a lot of pharmacological intervention, and I think I’m one of the 
biggest prescribers of Risperidone.”  This represents an interesting trend 
in the data and warrants further investigation to ascertain whether doctors 
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with more experience are more likely to use pharmacological 
intervention compared to less experienced doctors. Such a result could 
relate to differing educational or training practices across time within 
Australian paediatrics. The following quote from a more experienced 
participant may provide further insights into why this trend exists:  
 
I grew up under the influence of certain mentors who were sceptical of 
what those supportive measures [early intervention therapy] had to 
offer, and so I’ve always been somewhat hesitant about the 
effectiveness of those therapies. So I kind of live with that... 
 
Favouring the practice of medicating patients over other treatment 
approaches, such as early intervention therapies, relates perhaps to 
educational and training norms prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s.  
Thus, physicians educated during this period probably carry these norms 
with them throughout their careers.  
 
The tacit and experiential nature of diagnosing and treating ASDs 
The tension that exists between administrative goals of applying EBM to 
heterogeneous disorders such as ASDs, and the actual practice of 
applying EBM in the clinical encounter is examined in Chapter One. The 
idea that evidence produced by “specific” and “clean” trials can be 
applied to the ASD patient is to underestimate the complexity, 
uncertainties and difficulties faced by paediatricians. Every individual 
diagnosed with an ASD, it is claimed, is affected differently (Grinker 
2007). The participants interviewed for this study demonstrated that these 
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complexities, uncertainties and difficulties are sometimes addressed 
using standardised tools and guidelines, but mostly are managed using 
knowledge gained over many years of experience. This experiential form 
of knowledge is referred to throughout the interviews as a “gut feeling” 
or a “sixth sense”. While it is difficult to accurately gauge what this “gut 
feeling” entails due to the tacit nature of such knowledge, Wegner (1998) 
provides some insight into the experiential nuances involved in clinical 
practice:   
 
...implicit relations, tacit conventions, subtle cues, untold rules of 
thumb, recognizable intuitions, specific perceptions, well-tuned 
sensitivities, embodied understandings, underlying assumptions and 
shared world views. (Wegner 1998: 47)  
 
The tacit and experiential nature of diagnosing and treating ASDs was 
discussed by participants in four key ways: the importance of using 
observation and a “gut feeling” to diagnose ASDs, consensus among 
participants that the ADOS was the most effective/rigorous/accurate tool, 
consensus among the participants regarding treatment recommendations, 
and the maintenance of autonomy in the clinical encounter.  
 
Observation and using a “gut feeling” 
If we consider the steps that are used by participants in the diagnosis of 
ASDs, experiential and observational knowledge are the most highly 
ranked (see table 4). Both of these steps are discussed by eight of the nine 
participants. The experience gained from practicing as a paediatrician is 
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stressed as “the most important thing” by the majority of participants. 
Several more experienced participants stressed that being an “old and 
grey” paediatrician (that is, having decades of experience behind you) 
meant that they were better equipped to diagnose subtler forms of ASDs 
due to a heightened “sixth sense”. One participant stated:  
 
I do not use things like...the ADOS; that’s not my cup of tea; to me, it 
is a clinical diagnosis, and of course, being old and grey, one can pick 
these things, because when you see lots and lots and lots of children, 
full-blown autism is not a difficult diagnosis. The more subtle ones, 
the Asperger’s—not quite that clear-cut—but in some respects, the 
combination of speech and language issues, socialisation issues, 
repetitive behaviours; it’s not too difficult to say well, this child fits 
into an ASD category, and then you just mentally classify is this 
severe, is this moderate or is this mild, is it just Asperger’s... 
 
Interestingly though, and consistent with Timmermans and Angell’s 
(2001) study discussed in Chapter Two, less experienced participants 
also stressed the essential nature of clinical experience. In Timmermans 
and Angell’s (2001) study, paediatric residents claimed that if they were 
faced with a decision where the evidence conflicted with their 
experiential knowledge, they would “likely stick with experience” (160). 
A less experienced participant made a very similar statement: 
 
Well, I still think clinical diagnosis is the most important thing. I 
mean, I had access to all those tools when I started and yet, 10 years 
down the track I would actually prefer to go in there with no tools and 
10 years of experience rather than all the tools and no experience. It’s 
that whole pattern recognition where they talk about expertise is being 
able to recognise patterns and it’s just getting out there doing it and 
seeing lots of it; and that to me is more important than the standardised 
tools. 
 
81 
 
Both of these quotes demonstrate the highly tacit nature of this “gut 
feeling” knowledge. Phrases such as “one can just pick these things,” 
“you just mentally classify,” and “expertise is being able to recognise 
patterns” highlight Wegner’s (1998) view of the experiential nature of 
the clinical encounter. These “gut feeling” judgements are based on 
subtle cues, well-tuned sensitivities, embodied understandings, and 
recognisable intuitions that have been built up by diagnosing “lots and 
lots of children” and “just getting out there doing it and seeing lots of it.” 
The nature of this knowledge depends upon the paediatrician learning the 
subtleties of interaction in the clinical encounter and recognising a 
pattern of symptoms. This type of knowledge is very difficult (and 
probably impossible) to standardise and make explicit. The statistical 
approach of the epidemiological “gaze” simply does not apply to this 
type of recognition.  
 
The ADOS as the most effective/rigorous/accurate tool 
Seven of the nine participants believed that the ADOS is the most 
effective/rigorous/accurate tool available to them in the diagnosis of 
ASDs (see table 3). The ADOS stresses the importance of a lengthy 
observation of the child (in comparison to other tools), which in turn 
allows more flexibility in the diagnostic process by drawing on the 
experience and judgement of the clinician. In light of participants’ 
responses regarding the essential nature of using observation and a “gut 
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feeling” in the diagnostic process, this attitude towards the ADOS is not 
surprising. One participant stated: 
 
ADOS has been shown to be a much more accurate tool than the 
CARS because it involves observation and history taking and other 
aspects of interaction with a child, and it’s much longer...ADOS seems 
to be able to sort out [children on the spectrum] that are less clear-cut. 
 
This result appears to support Timmermans and Berg’s (2003) finding 
that that medical practice “inevitably contain[s] a mixture of [EBM and 
clinical experience], albeit not necessarily in equal proportions” (163-4). 
Despite this preference for the ADOS, only three participants actually 
claimed they used it in the clinical encounter (see table 3). One 
participant offered a possible explanation for this result: 
 
...there’s some evidence for the ADOS...but it’s all based on a 
diagnosis which is a construct and so it’s like ADHD - we’ve got all 
this evidence but we’ve got this construct that is probably meaningless, 
so we’re trying to fit things into little boxes. So how you can have real 
evidence, I think, is very difficult when you really don’t have a 
genuine diagnosis...because it’s a set of symptoms or whatever, so I 
think it’s very difficult to have genuine EBM under those conditions, 
until we get a better method, or dimensional tool. 
 
This statement could explain the incongruence of many of the 
participants’ responses. While the ADOS may be the “gold standard” of 
evidence for ASDs, essentially it is the best out of a bad lot. This also 
could explain why the use of clinical judgement, and basing diagnostic 
decisions on clinical experience, is such common practice amongst the 
participants. 
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The quote above is also interesting as it highlights the tension between 
the epidemiological “gaze” and the difficulty of applying it to the ASD 
patient in the clinical encounter. However, this participant, like Mesibov 
and colleagues (2006) (see Chapter One), illuminates the paradox of 
applying the epidemiological “gaze” to heterogeneous disorders. Despite 
the fact that ASDs do not fit the epidemiological mould, the medical 
profession continues to apply the epidemiological “gaze” in the hope that 
one day they will develop a “better method or dimensional tool.” This 
hope persists in spite of explicit explanations, such as Mesibov and 
colleagues (2006) and the participant’s comment above, whereby ASD is 
viewed as a “construct” and the potential for “real” evidence is 
questioned. It is interesting that even with the insights this participant 
possesses, the power of the epidemiological “gaze” persists. This could 
be related to the participant’s classification as a less experienced 
participant, and thus her educational background. As discussed in the 
previous section, educational and training norms are probably maintained 
throughout the physician’s career. Thus, this participant was educated 
and trained when EBM was an important part of the curriculum.  
 
Consensus about treatment recommendations 
Surprisingly, there was a significant amount of consensus amongst 
participants regarding the recommendation of treatments for children 
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diagnosed with an ASD (see list of graphs, graph 1). Most participants 
recommended early intervention programs (which focus on improving 
the child’s educational, behavioural and communication abilities) and/or 
speech therapy (which focuses on improving the child’s language skills) 
and/or occupational therapy (which focuses on improving the child’s 
gross and fine motor skills). Considering the variety of treatment 
approaches available to children on the spectrum and the difficulty of 
finding evidence to support most of the treatments, this consensus 
amongst participants presents as an interesting trend in the data. One 
participant provided an explanation as to how he believed paediatricians 
go about recommending treatments:  
 
I guess I’m just a simple clinician, and I use what I think works...I 
guess the approach [paediatricians] take is that if we notice the child 
has a weakness in an aspect of his or her development...we will try to 
plug it...that’s how I think a clinician approaches it. It’s not very 
scientific, is it? 
 
Here, the importance is identifying the weaknesses in the patient through 
clinical judgement and addressing each perceived weakness with 
approaches the paediatrician believes are effective: “I use what I think 
works.” Thus, there appear to be shared underlying assumptions as to 
what works in the treatment of ASDs amongst the participants.  
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Autonomy in the clinical encounter 
All nine participants indicated that they did not feel that their autonomy 
as a doctor was threatened by EBM or clinical practice guidelines. 
Several participants also pointed out that the field of developmental 
paediatrics is an inherently uncertain field. This allows clinicians much 
leeway in decision-making because guidelines, tools and treatment 
approaches are based on “weaker” evidence and are difficult to apply in 
practice due to the heterogeneous nature of many of the presenting 
conditions. One participant stated: 
 
It’s such an airy fairy area, developmental paediatrics; there’s no blood 
test or brain scan to prove it, so it’s such a clinical diagnosis; and so 
really...the management is therapy. 
 
Thus, maintaining autonomy within the field of developmental 
paediatrics seems to be a characteristic of this type of medicine due to the 
uncertain status of evidence and difficulty applying it within this field. 
Most participants suggest that while taking the evidence into account is 
important, at the end of the day it is clinical judgement or experience that 
has the “final word” and it ultimately overrides EBM and the tools 
associated with it. Furthermore, two more experienced participants 
reiterate this notion of autonomy through their suggestion that 
epidemiology is not an essential, nor stable, part of medicine. These 
participants stress that EBM is an “adjunct,” and that ultimately they 
practice medicine the way they want to: 
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I know that these things are the times, but one swims with the tide and 
one does what one does, and people come and see me and I guess 
that’s okay. 
  
Understanding tool and evidence “tinkering” in the diagnosis and 
treatment of ASDs 
 
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, tool “tinkering” appears to be a 
common practice amongst physicians and other health care workers. This 
study also demonstrates that tool “tinkering” occurs amongst the 
participants in the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs. A physician that 
partakes in tool “tinkering” views the tool or guideline as a means, to be 
acted upon with their own clinical judgement, goals and constraints of 
the situation in mind. Constraints within the clinical encounter could 
involve, for example, the socio-economic status of the patient or the 
complexities/difficulties of the condition being diagnosed and treated. 
Thus, a tool or guideline will be used by the physician when they deem it 
to be appropriate and when they see a need for it.  
 
In the case of diagnosing ASDs, most participants indicated it is not a 
“difficult” disorder to diagnose if the child exhibits “obvious” symptoms. 
One participant stated: “The diagnosis is pretty straight forward...some of 
[the patients] are so obvious that the woman across the road could 
diagnose them.” In such circumstances, participants emphasise that the 
use of diagnostic tools is pointless because it is a waste of time and 
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money. However, if the diagnosis was not straightforward and the 
participants were unsure, for example, if the patient had ADHD or an 
ASD, or perhaps elements of both, tools were often used to alleviate this 
uncertainty. One participant stated: “I might use an ADOS assessment at 
three years or four years if it’s not a straightforward diagnosis.” Problems 
of comorbidity are quite common in a disorder such as ASD which 
significantly complicates the clinical encounter. One participant claimed, 
in fact, that in such circumstances the diagnosis is so complex and 
uncertain that the diagnostic tools cannot be used:   
 
There are a group of children who I just think have very severe 
ADHD... so even the fact that they don’t respond to having their 
name called may simply be a concentration issue. And then there is 
another group who I find difficult again in that older age group 
where anxiety is such a component that what you perceive as poor 
eye contact in fact may be severe anxiety; and again if it is combined 
with ADHD I think it is very very difficult sometimes to tease those 
things apart and I’m not sure that any of our tools particularly help us 
with...separating that, either. In some ways it doesn’t matter because 
I think the treatment is much the same. 
 
Thus, there is a clear trend in the data indicating that tool use is 
associated with “difficult” or “uncertain” diagnoses. Tools are used in 
situations where there is uncertainty and complexity, and these situations 
exist at the margins of the clinical encounter. Uncertainty and complexity 
in the clinical encounter are experienced when a patient presents with 
symptoms that are hard to (tacitly) classify or tease apart from other 
disorders. This is a particularly interesting trend in the data: the 
principles of epidemiology (and thus EBM) are based on probability and 
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population statistics, yet it appears EBM is not applied to the probable or 
obvious ASD cases. Instead, it is used at the margins to deal with 
improbable and ambiguous ASD cases. This finding illuminates a 
paradox that exists when applying EBM to ASDs and will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter Five.  
 
EBM literature searches are also used at the margins of the clinical 
encounter, when the physician has exhausted their clinical experience 
resources. One of the less experienced participants stated: “I do searches 
when there’s a reason to: when there’s something else going on; when 
there’s a question I don’t know the answer to.”  
 
Another less experienced participant discussed the reasoning behind 
using or not using the tools in the clinical encounter. Interestingly, her 
discussion seemed to establish a clear distinction between situations in 
which clinical experience is needed and situations that require the use of 
tools. She stated:  
 
I think in some areas they are very valuable; at times I think they can 
try and oversimplify treatment; and I think at times, you’ve got to rely 
on your judgement and experience. But there are times when you’re 
going to find these tools very valuable; there are times when you feel 
they are not in the best interest of a patient or your judgement. 
 
This quote illuminates the apparent tension between EBM and clinical 
experience, presenting them as if they are mutually exclusive entities in 
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the clinical encounter. In Chapter Two, this distinction or tension is 
described as a “conceptual difficulty,” in that it oversimplifies the clinical 
encounter by producing an either/or situation. However, most 
participants described the tool “tinkering” process in similar terms when 
compared to the five studies discussed in Chapter Two. Participants 
explained that medical practice was an act of negotiating in and between 
the tools, experience, and the patient. This negotiation process was 
justified by the heterogeneity (and thus uncertainty) of ASDs and 
inherent problems with the tools and guidelines (see table 5). Thus, the 
tool requires “tinkering” to make it functional in the clinical encounter.  
 
Three main problems with the tools/guidelines were discussed (see table 
5). First, the inconsistencies between the diagnostic guideline (DSM-IV) 
and the tools (such as ADOS): “I might have a child who meets the 
ADOS criteria but doesn’t quite meet the DSM-IV [criteria].” Second, 
participants discussed problems with the language and structure of the 
DSM-IV and that these problems made it difficult to apply and use in 
practice. One participant stated: “What I think is one of the issues is there 
is so many different terms for the spectrum...you can get caught in the 
semantics of it.” Third, participants discussed the failure of the diagnostic 
tools to produce a definitive diagnosis of an ASD:  
 
...like today, this little boy actually did really well, and I’m thinking 
has he or hasn’t he got the diagnosis of PDD(NOS) but then, as soon 
as I stopped and he wasn’t getting my attention , he’s spinning in 
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circles and holding the plane up to the corner of his eye, that didn’t 
come out on the ADOS; and I noticed a few times as soon as I stop 
interacting with them and they have a bit of free play just completely 
unstructured sometimes I will see things, or they will pick all of the 
cars out of this box and then line them all up; and I’ll go 
mmmmmmmmmm! 
 
Furthermore, the tools can altogether miss a diagnosis:  
 
There’s really no ideal screening tools...as far as I’m concerned, they 
all give you some help, but none of them is diagnostic as such...it’s not 
uncommon for me to see kids who’ve been through various 
assessments...and they say ‘this kid hasn’t got autism’, but, in fact, the 
child has autism.  
 
These three problems provide insight into why the tools and guidelines 
are rarely sufficient on their own in the diagnosis of ASDs. Seven of the 
nine participants explicitly stated they had one or more difficulties with 
the tools and guidelines (see table 5). These difficulties justify the 
practice of tool “tinkering” and highlight that this is an essential practice 
if these standardised tools are expected to be used in the clinical 
encounter. Thus, an ideal tool for diagnosing ASDs does not exist: 
“medicine doesn’t fail to meet the standards: the standards fail to meet 
reality” (Berg & Mol 1998: 10).  
 
The use of EBM in the treatment of ASDs also requires manipulation and 
“tinkering”. Many participants indicated they experienced difficulties 
using the evidence to aid in the recommendation of treatments. They 
claimed that due to the heterogeneous nature of ASDs, it was difficult to 
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“put in a good study” (that is, a RCT), that there was a “genuine lack of 
evidence” for most of the therapy-based interventions, and that “there is 
very limited good research on which [treatment] is better and which is 
more appropriate.” One participant discussed the evidence “tinkering” he 
used in the treatment of his patients with an ASD:  
 
Do I practice evidence-based medicine? Well, obviously every doctor 
thinks he does, but the dilemma is that in behavioural medicine it is 
clear that some people respond to certain medications and some don’t; 
and so though the evidence says some don’t, the fact is that some do, 
and my role is to roll through certain therapies in an attempt to identify 
whether the patient responds to or benefits with what I am trying him 
on; if evidence says they don’t respond to x, but if one in ten does 
respond to x, is my patient that one in ten? So, I don’t dismiss 
therapies that are deemed not appropriate. 
 
This response indicates, again, the problems associated with applying the 
construct of EBM and the “gold standard” to the uncertain field of 
behavioural medicine. The point the participant makes here is that while 
the evidence may say that a certain therapy or medication is ineffective in 
nine out of ten children, there is still one child that could benefit. Thus, it 
is important to “cover all the bases”, whereby covering all the bases 
involves “tinkering” or negotiating in and between the tool, clinical 
experience, and the patient.  
 
The political and social forces affecting medical practice 
As discussed in the previous section, tool “tinkering” is often motivated 
by certain situational constraints placed on the physician in the clinical 
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encounter. This section will explore the situational constraints that 
participants felt affected their clinical “gaze”. The five studies reviewed 
in Chapter Two examine the impact of the social world on the medical 
world, emphasising that physicians do not practice in a scientific vacuum 
but are affected by the social phenomena that surrounds their work. For 
example, Rafalovich’s (2005) study highlights that clinicians involved in 
the diagnosis and treatment of ADHD are often affected by the 
controversy that surrounds this disorder. The research discussed here 
found that there were two main themes discussed by participants: the 
caregiver-paediatrician relationship and the impact of government 
funding. 
 
The parent-paediatrician relationship 
The parent1-paediatrician relationship was discussed by seven 
participants (see graph 2). Two main issues were cited as affecting the 
role of the doctor in the clinical encounter: the parents’ wants and needs 
and the parents’ agency in the treatment process.  
 
Conveying the diagnosis of an ASD to the parent of the child is a 
complex and challenging task. According to the participants in this study, 
breaking the news to a family that their child is affected by autism 
requires empathy and sensitivity. Thus, medical practice is often altered 
                                                            
1
 The term “parent” will be used here for convenience, but it is important to note that 
not all caregivers are parents.  
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to accommodate the needs and wants of the family. This occurs in many 
ways. First, certain diagnostic tools and treatments may not be offered or 
mentioned to the family due to their expense. One participant claimed 
that she believed it would be “cruel” to discuss early intervention therapy 
with a family of a low socio-economic status, although she recommends 
such treatments to families with adequate financial means. Second, as 
discussed in the previous section, diagnostic tools are usually only used 
at the margins, when the paediatrician faces uncertainties in the clinical 
encounter. However, some participants mentioned that they will also use 
diagnostic tools if the parent(s) is having difficulties accepting the 
diagnosis or to help them understand what the diagnosis entails: 
 
As far as diagnosis goes, I think, parents like some criteria, they like to 
say they agree and its always a nice closure for the parents, this isn’t 
just a gut feeling – or this isn’t the doctor just trying to get the money 
and get me out of the office; they want something that says okay, this 
is the real thing, and this will push them on to therapies a bit harder 
and faster if they realise there is a definite diagnosis; and it’s not wishy 
washy – you have a diagnostic tool and you say, okay, tick, tick, tick, 
this is where we’re heading...Parents like to have something in black 
and white.  
 
Third, participants stated they will refer patients to treatments they do not 
necessarily believe to be effective because the parent expresses interest in 
them, or places pressure on the doctor: 
 
I grew up under the influence of certain mentors who were sceptical of 
what those supportive measures [early intervention therapy] had to 
offer, and so I’ve always been somewhat hesitant about the 
effectiveness of those therapies. So I kind of live with that, but I still 
refer the children, because I think they certainly warrant assessment 
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because the parents expect them and the parents certainly deserve a 
trial of those therapies, to see what outcome there is. (emphasis added)  
 
Fourth, one participant claimed she felt it was important to keep up-to-
date with the ASD treatment literature for the sake of the parents, and 
that it was her role to direct parents towards treatments with an evidence-
base to justify the time and money spent on them. She stated: 
parents like evidence-based...they want to know what’s best and 
what’s been proved...they’re going to spend their time and their money 
in a wise fashion, for the better outcome...one of our roles is to be able 
to provide that evidence-based research in terms of therapy.  
 
Fifth, participants indicated they follow an empathetic approach when 
discussing the diagnosis and treatment options with the patient’s 
parent(s). A common difficulty faced by the participants in the 
recommendation of treatments to the family was communication with the 
parents (see graph 2). Participants expressed an awareness of the stress 
and anguish involved (for the family) in receiving a diagnosis of ASD, 
and thus the difficulties that follow from this when explaining to the 
parent(s) that most of the treatments available are expensive and take 
place over many years. One participant claimed that “some of these 
parents are just running themselves ragged” in the process of finding 
appropriate treatment interventions for their child. Communication with 
parent(s) was therefore described as difficult due to the participants’ 
emotional discomfort explaining that the treatment process is arduous, 
long, and does not guarantee success. One participant stated:  
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[explaining to parents that] the therapeutic timeline is going to be very 
long and protracted; and I find that hard and the parents find that very 
hard to understand that everything is going to take a very long time.  
 
 
The other main issue that emerged in the parent-paediatrician relationship 
is the agency of the parents in the treatment process. One participant 
reiterated the importance of the paediatrician working with the parent to 
help them understand the diagnosis and the treatment options. He 
describes his role as a “facilitator,” whereby he provides preliminary 
assistance and then the caregiver takes over and makes the important 
decisions as to what treatment approach(es) to follow:  
 
I think the role of the paediatrician, and my role, is a facilitator, to 
make the parents aware of the diagnosis, or to support their fears if a 
child has that; and then to try and steer them in the direction where 
they can get help; and to cut out things if  they think it’s not making 
any use; to let them know about things like respite care, which they 
may need if the child is extremely demanding and it’s disruptive to the 
whole fabric of family life. 
 
 
Another participant highlighted his respect for the research and effort put 
in by parents in finding out about and trialling different treatment 
approaches. This respect was also translated to the belief that he had 
much to learn from these parents, and could use their knowledge to better 
his own practice. He stated: 
 
I have two boys who I’ve looked after, whose mother has been 
absolutely fantastic in assessing every facility in the community. I’ve 
asked her...would she write up a recommendation list of what she’s 
found most helpful.  
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Furthermore, several participants also down-play the role of the 
paediatrician in the treatment process, simultaneously highlighting the 
agency of the parent(s):  
 
My experience is that, what the doctors say is really irrelevant to 
parents; what happens in the real world is the parents are given a 
diagnosis, we do the paper work, try to get as much financial help for 
the family...and then in my case, you refer them to Aspect for the play 
intervention, I refer them to speech therapy; and then parents do their 
own thing, quite honestly. 
 
The impact of government funding 
Four participants commented on the implications of government funding 
and how this affected their recommendations of treatments. One 
participant claimed she often recommended treatments based on 
therapies she could access “through the community health centre” and 
recommended preschool programs based on the funding that could be 
obtained. Another participant mentioned that despite the lack of evidence 
supporting the effectiveness of early intervention programs, she 
recommended families get the “Helping Children with Autism Package” 
(a government-funded initiative) to help meet the costs of treatments 
such as ABA and also recommended the “public ABA program” which 
provides twenty weeks of free ABA. Furthermore, one participant 
claimed that she does not like the drug Risperidone (used to treat 
hyperactivity and aggression) but is often forced to prescribe it because 
“it’s the only one on the PBS (Pharmaceutical Benefits Schedule) 
available to me”. She goes on to state that she would prefer to prescribe 
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other drugs (such as Abilify), and in fact does, “if [the parents] can afford 
it”. Another participant made the following comment:  
 
...you will see the recommendation is 10 to 12 hours of direct therapy a 
week; it seems to be a magic figure and I think it has probably come 
out of the fact that the Americans were subsidising 12 hours a week 
and I think that’s become an administrative reality – it has become the 
folklore of what therapy is needed.  
 
 
These comments provide important insights into the social motivations 
that affect paediatricians in the clinical encounter. These four 
participants’ statements illuminate the tensions that are created through 
the government involvement in medical practice. Medical judgement and 
decision making are not only affected by the medical “facts” and 
“evidence,” or what they believe is the right medical decision for the 
patient, but also by patterns of government subsidy. Thus, government 
subsidised treatments become the “right” treatment options for the 
patient. The participant responses indicate a concern that treatment norms 
or standards are being created by the government, and are having a 
significant impact on prescribing and recommendation behaviours.  
 
Concluding remarks 
This study demonstrates that evidence-based medicine and its 
instruments are used by paediatricians in the diagnosis and 
recommendation of treatments for patients with an autism spectrum 
disorder. However, their use is varied and complex, and is affected by 
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factors such as the paediatrician’s experience, the tacit and experiential 
nature of diagnosing and treating ASDs, the uncertainties inherent to the 
disorder of autism, and the influences of political and social forces in the 
clinical encounter.  
 
Discussions about the use of experience versus EBM and its instruments 
were referred to in matter-of-fact terms, with some participants explicitly 
stating that this was the only way to practice in the field of 
developmental paediatrics because it is such an “airy fairy” field. Tool 
“tinkering” was a common practice amongst the participants to reconcile 
the tension between using the evidence and the difficulty of applying it in 
the clinical encounter. This seems to suggest that paediatricians 
practicing in this field are socialised to accept the scientific limitations of 
developmental paediatrics.  
 
Thus, the use of EBM in the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs is 
selective: the participants in this study suggest that they use it when they 
see a need for it (for example, to address uncertainty in diagnosis or to 
help explain the diagnosis to the family). This study highlights that 
EBM’s functionality in the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs lies at the 
margins of the clinical encounter. This is a particularly interesting finding 
because it contradicts the fundamental meaning and purpose of EBM. 
EBM is based on statistical or probability science, in that it identifies 
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optimal treatment approaches to, and common risk factors for, various 
conditions. Thus, EBM indicates approaches the physician should take 
based on the typical patient. However, this study shows that experiential 
and tacit knowledge tends to be used when a patient presents with 
obvious or typical ASD symptoms, and that EBM is used when dealing 
with outlier cases and ambiguities in the clinical encounter. Thus, a 
paradox exists when it comes to using EBM in clinical encounter with 
the ASD patient: the probability data of EBM is applied to the 
improbable cases. This finding will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Five.  
 
In terms of the diagnosis of ASDs, there appears to be much variability in 
the steps used in the diagnostic process as well as the diagnostic tools 
used. It does not appear that the tools and guidelines developed to aid in 
the diagnosis of ASDs are having a regularising or standardising effect. 
This could be due to the many factors affecting the motivations of the 
clinician in the clinical (diagnostic) encounter (see diagram 1 below).  
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Diagram 1: The reality of the use of EBM and its instruments in the 
(diagnostic) clinical encounter: Factors that affect the negotiation 
between experience and the evidence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of recommending treatments for patients with an ASD, there 
appeared to be consensus amongst participants both in the treatments 
recommended and the difficulties experienced in the process of 
recommending treatments. This is an interesting result when one 
considers the varying motivations affecting the clinician in the clinical 
encounter (see diagram 2, below).  
 
Functional Factors 
 
• Tools do not 
distinguish between 
comorbid disorders 
e.g. anxiety and 
ADHD 
• Semantics/wordiness 
of DSM-IV make it 
difficult to apply 
• Categories in DSM-
IV difficult to apply 
in the clinical 
encounter (e.g. 
PDD(NOS) and 
Asperger’s) 
Social Factors 
 
• Use of tools to help 
the family 
understand/accept the 
diagnosis – clinician 
being sensitive to the 
family’s needs 
• Tools used based on 
financial means of 
family, i.e. ADOS 
cannot be used in 
many instances due to 
the expense 
• Belief that clinical 
experience overrides 
the use of tools 
• Use of evidence a 
“personal thing”, 
dependent on 
socialisation in 
education/training  
Evidence-based 
medicine, 
clinical 
guidelines & 
tools 
Clinical Factors 
 
• Used of tools to confirm clinical 
judgement 
• Sometimes tools help to resolve 
uncertainty about diagnosis 
• Evidence as a default when  
clinical experience cannot provide 
the answer 
• Tools are utilised on the diagnostic 
margins   
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Diagram 2: The reality of the use of EBM in the recommendation of 
treatments in the clinical encounter: Factors that affect the negotiation 
between experience and the evidence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The overwhelming theme of these interviews is the profound effect the 
social world has on the medical world. The doctor is not only negotiating 
a relationship between clinical experience and the evidence, but is also 
affected by social and political factors. These factors include the values 
and norms established in their education and training, the families’ 
financial constraints, being sympathetic to the families’ acceptance and 
understanding of the diagnosis, and the involvement of bureaucratic 
bodies within medicine and the effects this has on the treatment process.   
Clinical Factors 
 
• Clinical judgement or experience important 
in decisions about treatments: “I use what I 
think works” 
• More experienced clinicians tend to prescribe 
medications – Educational/training 
differences? 
 
Evidence-
based 
medicine 
Social Factors 
 
• Agency of parents in the 
clinical encounter 
• Sympathy expressed by 
the clinician regarding 
the family’s plight 
• Using/not using EBM 
seen as a “personal 
thing” or “generational 
thing” 
• Cost of treatments 
• Bureaucratic bodies 
creating treatment 
‘norms’ – i.e. prescribing 
a drug/therapy because 
family receives 
compensation for it, not 
because it is the ‘best’ 
drug/therapy 
• Use of EBM based on 
differing 
educational/training 
experiences 
Functional Factors 
 
• “gold standard” of 
EBM does not 
apply to ASDs 
• Lack of “good” 
evidence 
• EBM 
oversimplifies the 
treatment of ASDs 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION: THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF EBM AND ASDs 
 
I think [EBM] is a complete hoax personally...trials are done on such 
specific, clean questions but they never quite apply to the patient in 
front of you...I think that is the problem with practice at my level – it is 
very individual. That is why I don’t agree with EBM: there isn’t any 
evidence to help you deal with the difficult patient. (Dawson et al 
1998: 21) 
 
Existing literature 
The above quote from a doctor interviewed in Dawson and colleagues’ 
(1998) study captures the quandary facing paediatricians in the clinical 
encounter with the ASD patient. In the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs, 
every patient is a “difficult patient.” ASDs are heterogeneous, there is no 
biological marker or test to aid diagnosis, and there is a lack of RCTs 
supporting diagnostic techniques and the effectiveness of treatment 
interventions. Consequently, it is difficult to produce “clean” and 
“specific” research questions, and then apply the research in the clinical 
encounter. While the medical literature acknowledges these difficulties, 
the medical profession continues to advocate the application of EBM and 
its instruments to the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs. As demonstrated 
by this study, the process of applying EBM and its instruments to this 
heterogeneous disorder is a negotiated and complex process; full of 
tensions, paradoxes and ambiguities.  
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The findings of this study contribute to a socially nuanced view of 
Foucault’s medical “gaze”. The medical “gaze” of the participants 
interviewed for this study is made up of a complex interaction and 
negotiation between clinical experience, EBM, tacit evaluation, and 
social motivations affecting the clinical encounter. Whilst epidemiology 
is portrayed as the new paradigm that has engulfed medical 
epistemology, the reality of medical practice within developmental 
paediatrics, as indicated by the participants in this study, is that the 
clinician determines the direction of the clinical encounter through the 
interplay of various factors. Ultimately the path taken will coalesce with 
their “professional trajectories” (Timmermans & Berg 2003), and will 
involve “tinkering” with the tools to make them work in practice.  
 
The participants do not follow the epidemiological paradigm by trying to 
force the square peg of ASDs into the round hole of EBM. They fashion 
a hole themselves, slowly shaping it over many consultations with the 
patient (taking months, even years, if need be) until the peg fits, or until 
the doctor has exhausted all of their resources. An example of this 
shaping process includes “tinkering” with the tools and evidence. During 
this process, EBM and its instruments are often used, but they are used in 
a way that coalesces with the paediatrician’s motivations. These 
motivations include social factors such as educational norms, and clinical 
uncertainties such as the inability to distinguish between an ASD and 
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ADHD (comorbidity). This notion of the social nature of medical 
practice is supported by the empirical literature discussed in Chapter 
Two.  
 
This socially nuanced picture of the clinical encounter with the ASD 
patient is made more complex by the role of the patient’s family. Several 
participants discussed the agency of the parents during the clinical 
encounter, as well as in their pursuit of treatments for their child. For 
example, several participants commented that as a paediatrician 
recommending treatments for ASDs to families, ultimately their role was 
to act as a “facilitator”. They explain the options, describe and evaluate 
the evidence, make recommendations; but in the end, the parent makes 
the decision as to whether the evidence is applicable to their child. 
Furthermore, many of the participants indicated that the parents are often 
the deciding factor as to whether they will use a diagnostic tool or not. 
These results are consistent with Timmermans and Berg’s (2003) 
findings regarding the agency of the patient in the clinical encounter (see 
Chapter Two).  
 
This study also explored the participants’ clinical experience as a factor 
affecting the use of EBM and its instruments in the clinical encounter. 
The literature highlights that one of the objectives of introducing EBM 
into the hospital environment, and medical practice more generally, was 
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to ‘level the playing field’ between the attending and the resident, or the 
more experienced doctor and less experienced doctor. Thus, physicians 
are increasingly expected to base medical decisions on the evidence, 
rather than experience or authority (Timmermans & Berg 2003). 
However, this study and Timmermans and Angell’s (2001) study (see 
Chapter Two), highlight that EBM does not appear to ‘level the playing 
field’ in practice. In this study, most participants indicated the necessity 
of the use of a “gut feeling” to aid them in the diagnosis of ASDs: 
“because ASD is such a clinical diagnosis”. Furthermore, they 
emphasised that while they take the evidence into account, clinical 
judgement or experience has the ‘final word’ in clinical decision-making.  
 
This study also found that the use of diagnostic tools occurs at the 
margins of the clinical encounter. This finding is particularly interesting 
for two reasons. First, it illuminates a paradox that exists in the 
diagnostic practices of the participants interviewed for this study. Data 
based on typical ASD cases (EBM) is applied to the ambiguous and 
difficult to classify cases. Second, this paradoxical use of EBM is yet to 
be discussed in the literature. This finding will be discussed in the 
following section as an important impact of this study.  
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The impact of this study 
This study demonstrates that the focus of existing research neither 
captures nor reflects the complexities, subtleties and uncertainties of 
diagnosing and treating ASDs in the clinical encounter. The sociological 
literature’s silence on the role of EBM in the diagnosis and treatment of 
ASDs is surprising and significant given the medical uncertainty 
surrounding these disorders: ASDs provide an ideal framework through 
which to explore the limitations of EBM. This study demonstrates that 
the use of EBM in the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs is affected by 
four key factors: experience and education, the tacit nature of the clinical 
encounter, tool “tinkering,” and social and political factors. While 
sociological investigations of medical practice have examined these 
factors, they are yet to be understood in relation to Australian paediatrics 
and ASDs.  
 
However, the paradoxical nature of the use of tools in the clinical 
encounter has not been explored in any of the literature to date. This 
study, therefore, illuminates a function of EBM that has previously gone 
unrecognised, and consequently, raises some important questions that 
warrant further investigation. Two questions that I will address in this 
section relate to why this paradox exists when diagnosing ASDs, and how 
this paradox could be applicable to other areas of medicine.   
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As discussed throughout this thesis, diagnosing and treating ASDs within 
a medical context is a difficult and complex process. This study 
demonstrates that experiential knowledge is usually the primary resource 
paediatricians draw on to diagnose a patient with an ASD. Participants 
indicated that they use a “gut feeling” to form an initial hypothesis about 
whether the child has an ASD or not. In many cases, this initial 
hypothesis, based on experiential knowledge, is enough to form a 
diagnosis. However, it is when the participant is unable to form a certain 
hypothesis that they seek out other resources to alleviate their 
uncertainty. The use of diagnostic tools, therefore, appears to be 
motivated by a need to provide a definitive diagnosis. The parent comes 
in with a question: “does my child have an ASD,” and the paediatrician is 
expected to provide and explain this answer. Thus, diagnostic tools are 
used at the margins of the clinical encounter to perhaps provide the 
definitive diagnosis that the paediatrician is unable to offer the parents 
using just their experiential knowledge. Furthermore, the diagnostic tools 
provide a justification for this diagnosis, and as one participant stated: 
“you have a diagnostic tool and you say, okay, tick, tick, tick, this is 
where we’re heading...Parents like to have something in black and 
white.” Deferring to the tool in difficult or complex cases perhaps 
highlights the medical profession’s attitude to EBM: it allows health care 
workers to sort things out when they are difficult to sort out; it provides a 
way to proceed when all other ways have been barricaded. However, as 
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discussed above, EBM’s claimed functionality lies with the majority of 
medical cases, not the minority.  
 
Thus, understanding whether and how this paradoxical use of EBM exists 
in other medical contexts is important. While it may only be relevant in 
the context of this study, that is the diagnosis of ASDs by paediatricians 
in private practice, it may have implications for other heterogeneous 
disorders, such as ADHD and chronic fatigue syndrome. Physicians 
diagnosing and treating these disorders probably share the same 
difficulties in applying EBM in the clinical encounter that the 
participants in this study discussed. Furthermore, this finding could also 
have implications for medical practice in general. “Difficult” (that is, 
difficult to classify or diagnose) patients are encountered by medical 
practitioners on a daily basis. These patients also seek to be “sorted out” 
with a diagnostic categorisation. It remains to be investigated whether 
doctors in other fields are deferring to tools at the margins of the clinical 
encounter.  
 
Future directions of research  
As illustrated in Chapter Three, some important limitations exist in the 
interview format. It has been suggested in the literature that interviewing 
“elites” (Sarantakos 2005) can be problematic as they can be guarded in 
their responses due to a mistrust in how their responses may be used. 
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Furthermore, as interview data is self-report data, one cannot guarantee 
the truthfulness or accuracy of responses. A problem that may be 
particularly relevant in regards to the context of this study is the ‘social 
standards’ bias, whereby participants provide answers that may have 
been adjusted to conform to social standards. For example, a study 
conducted by Hunter (1991) (as cited by McDonald et al 2006) suggests 
that doctors practice according to an unwritten code that holds that if 
their practice is closely governed by guidelines or tools they are no 
longer regarded as doctors. However, it is important to keep in mind this 
study was conducted 18 years ago, and thus its applicability to this study 
is questionable. Yet the point remains that medicine is made up of 
socially motivated beings, and thus the truthfulness of their answers is a 
factor to consider. Furthermore, it is suspected that due to the time 
constraints of the interview (thirty minutes), participants were unable to 
discuss in much detail the steps and processes used in medical practice to 
diagnose and recommend treatments for patients with an ASD. This 
means that some of the data could be incomplete, in so far as it does not 
cover the true complexity and detail of the clinical encounter and the 
clinical process.  
 
An adequate way to overcome such critiques would be to actually 
observe the participants in the clinical encounter, or medical practice 
more generally; as well as interview the participants. This technique was 
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also identified by Timmermans and Angell (2001), in their study of 
paediatric residents, to be the most favourable in this form of research. 
Both Fortin (2008) and Hunter and colleagues (2008) conducted 
ethnographic research in paediatric settings, illustrating the feasibility of 
this approach.  Thus, using an ethnographic approach to address the 
issues examined in this study would provide more detailed, and therefore 
more accurate, data.  
 
In regards to the findings of this study, several areas warrant further 
investigation. First, the tacit and experiential nature of the clinical 
encounter is difficult to explore in an interview format. This study 
provides the groundwork for exploring these factors more fully. Due to 
the tacit and subtle nature of the clinical encounter, the most appropriate 
methodological approach involves ethnographic research. Second, the 
role of experience and education in determining diagnostic and treatment 
practices with regards to ASDs needs to be investigated using a larger 
sample size. This warrants investigation not only due to the paradigm 
shift from pathophysiology to epidemiology within medicine, but also 
because ASDs are a relatively new category in the DSM. Some of the 
more experienced paediatricians interviewed for this study indicated that 
their education did not involve learning about ASDs and that they have 
had to “make it up as we go along.” Third, this study investigated the 
social and political forces affecting the decision-making of paediatricians 
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involved in the diagnosis and treatment of ASDs. Two are discussed in 
detail, however, it is probable that there are many more affecting clinical 
judgement, such as the role of industry and medical administrative 
bodies. Fourth, the paradoxical use of EBM in the clinical encounter 
requires further investigation. This practice of applying probability data 
to outlier cases has not yet been examined in the literature. Future studies 
need to examine why this trend exists, whether it extends into other 
medical fields, and whether it is unique to certain medical conditions or 
disorders.  
 
Another research question raised by this study involves the investigation 
into the motivations of the ASD tool and guideline creators. Berg’s 
(1998) examination of the socially and politically-charged nature of the 
process of creating tools and guidelines, as discussed in Chapter One, 
could provide further insight into the ASD diagnostic and treatment 
process, as well as the medical management of heterogeneous disorders 
more generally.  
 
It is evident that there are many directions future research can take in the 
sociological investigation of the medical management of ASDs. This 
thesis draws on extensive empirical work examining EBM in medical 
practice, but provides the first glimpse of how EBM is used in practice 
when applied to ASDs. It has contributed to the sociological EBM 
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literature by analysing the key factors that influence and affect the 
clinical encounter with the ASD patient. This study not only fills a void 
in sociological understandings of ASDs, but also provides useful insights 
for the medical literature and the caregivers and families of children on 
the autism spectrum.  
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APPENDICIES 
 
 
Appendix 1 – Interview Questions 
 
(1) How long have you been practicing as a paediatrician? 
 
(2) Diagnosis 
 
(a) What steps are involved, for you as a paediatrician, when 
diagnosing a two year-old child with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD)?  
 
(b) What steps are involved, for you as a paediatrician, when 
diagnosing a three year-old child with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD)?  
 
(c) What steps are involved, for you as a paediatrician, when 
diagnosing a four year-old child (or older) with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD)?  
 
(d) In your experience, have you encountered any problems with 
the clinical guidelines or standardised tools that are used to 
diagnose ASD? 
 
(e) There are a variety of diagnostic tools/guidelines that 
paediatricians are able to use in the diagnosis of ASD (for 
example, I know of the ADOS, CARS, GARS).  
(i) Could you estimate how many guidelines and tools are 
available to you as a paediatrician when diagnosing 
ASD. 
(ii) Do you believe one of the diagnostic tools is more 
effective/rigorous/accurate etc. than the others? If yes, 
why?  
 
(3) Treatment 
 
(a) What steps are involved, for you as a paediatrician, when 
recommending treatment(s) for a child diagnosed with ASD? 
 
(b) Have you experienced any difficulties when trying to 
recommend treatments for a child diagnosed with ASD?  
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(4) Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) 
 
(a) Please define the term ‘evidence-based medicine’ 
 
(b) Did your education and training in Paediatrics involve 
learning about EBM? 
 
(c) Do you conduct (EBM) literature searches to aid you in the 
diagnosis of ASD? 
 
(d) Do you conduct (EBM) literature searches to aid you in the 
recommendation of treatments for patients diagnosed with 
ASD?  
 
(e) If you do not use EBM, why not?  
 
(f) Do you feel your autonomy as a doctor is threatened by EBM, 
clinical practice guidelines (CPGs), or tools?  
 
(g) How important do you think EBM, CPGs and standardised 
tools are in the field of paediatrics in Australia? 
 
 
 
 
